Interview with Dixie Elliott

Peace Processing the Memory of the Conflict

No Choice But to Take It

Radio Free Éireann Interview with Richard O'Rawe

Take It Down From the Mast

A bit of Stick had at the recent Anti-Internment March in Belfast

Wiki-Dump

All correspondence in relation to Allison Morris' and Ciaran Barnes' complaints and the NUJ's handling of the issue.

True to Their Words

Disproportionate Coverage of NUJ case in the Irish News

What Price Justice?

For Irish News reporter Allison Morris, Celtic v Cliftonville in Glasgow

The Weird World

Journalists and Online Shenanigans: Double Standards Exposed

Dolours Price Archive

"I look forward to the freedom to lay bare my experiences unfettered by codes now redundant."

Irish Republican Movement Collection

Annoucing the Irish Republican Movement Collection online archive at IUPUI

The Belfast Project and Boston College

The Belfast Project and the Boston College Subpoena Case: The following paper was given at the Oral History Network of Ireland (OHNI) Second Annual Conference in Ennis, Co Clare on Saturday the 29th September 2012

Challenge and Change

Former hunger striker Gerard Hodgkins delivered the 2013 annual Brendan Hughes Memorial Lecture

Brendan Hughes: A Life in Themes

There is little to be gained in going from an A to Z chronological tour of the life of Brendan Hughes. The knowledge is out there. Instead a number of themes will covey to those who are interested what was the essence of the man.

55 HOURS

Day-by-day account of events of the 1981 Hunger Strike. A series in four parts:
July 5July 6July 7July 8

The Bell and the Blanket

Journals of Irish Republican Dissent: A study of the Bell and Blanket magazines by writers Niall Carson and Paddy Hoey

Sunday, May 31, 2009

Another Sky

As I write only days after the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, widely interpreted as marking the extinction of liberal dissent in Russia, the threat to the uncensored voice is growing. This is not the time for those who deal in ideas to practise self-censorship; it is time to defend democracy - Carol Seymour Jones, Chair of the Writers in Prison Committee, English PEN. October 2006.

PEN is the organisation behind this anthology edited by two of its leading lights, Lucy Popescu and Carole Seymour-Jones. The work takes its title from a poem featured in the collection. It was written by Mansur Muhammad Ahmad Rajih, a Yemeni writer who has endured exile, imprisonment, torture, and a false murder conviction for which he was sentenced to death. That he was later released, having first spent 15 years in prison, was a consequence of the type of international campaigning that this book shows to be so necessary.

The first page opened makes a point common to the authors of the writings on the pages that follow: ‘they have all been coerced into not writing.’ Some faced ‘the ultimate form of censorship – murder.’ In an internet age which has been heralded as one that is pushing out the boundaries of freedom of opinion the book protests that ‘Internet giants Yahoo! and Google are cooperating with repressive governments to silence dissidence.’ In the midst of ostensible opportunity for free expression the ubiquitous censor is determined not to be denied its prize – silence.

Prison, death and exile thematically structure Another Sky as its editors’ intention is to flag up three ways in which writers become prey for the censor. The spirit that animates the works chosen is exemplified by Angel Cuadra, held for 15 years in a Cuban prison. He captures the ethos of resistance that a writer must embody otherwise risk facing psychological destruction as in the much heralded new man of Cuban socialism, who is portrayed by Cuadra as a broken man.

After the horse is broken
They reward it with pats on the shoulder …
And he marches tame and docile
- Blind in his vomit -
Like a slinking dog

It need not be Havana or socialism. Examples abound from other places and regime types across the globe where the crushing of the writerly spirit is pursued by those determined to maintain the darkness.

The case of Ken Saro Wiwa poignantly illustrates that writing is not a mere pastime but an intensely political activity that often brings deadly opposition. He was hanged in Nigeria in 1995 because of his outspoken opposition against the oil giants Shell on behalf of the Ogoni people. Five days before his execution he wrote a piece ‘On the Death of Ken Sara Wiwa’ which was smuggled out of prison. In it he ‘described his own death and its aftermath.’ It displayed a level of detachment, presence of mind and conviction rarely seen in human beings staring murder in the face.

Within these pages there are many nuggets but one brilliant line leaps out and imposes its own full stop. The reader may carry on but takes little in as the mind drifts back to those words of the Turkmenistan writer Rakhim Esenov: ‘a ruler who does not befriend a poet is a fool, but a poet who tries to befriend a ruler is twice as stupid.’ We see it in the North of Ireland where one-time powerful artists now line up with the state. It did little for their writing or creativity and much for the legitimisation and refinement of state repression. Despite the prudence of Rakhim Esenov the state alone is not the sole censor. While many writers met their end through government persecution others provoked the ire of guerrillas. We learn from this collection that Thiagarajah Selvanithy was kidnapped and later killed by the Tamil Tigers.

For certain, wherever censors are to be found there too will congregate clerics. Little to express surprise at when the censors of Iran feature in the pages of Another Sky. The Iranian writer Akbar Ganji is the author of Dungeon of Ghosts. This wielder of the pen has been imprisoned and endured hunger strike, yet has been unrelenting in his exposure of the Iranian government formerly presided over by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, for its involvement in the murders of five writers and intellectuals in 1998. In an insightful observation often overlooked by apologists for the totalitarian Left, Akbar Ganji commenting on Iranian society made the point that it hosted fascist movements but ‘there are also individuals whose psychological disposition drives them into fascist movements.’ The point is well made. Often we find that the Left, while not fascist in itself, draws the same type of disposition to its own ranks. They are attracted to the Left not by its politics but by its authoritarianism. And with consummate ease they adopt political postures that can only be considered fascistic. Today we find them siding with the whip wielding morality police rather than with the women whose flesh is being ripped to shreds by the thugs of Allah.

On the question of how writers should deal with the phenomenon of religious intolerance Orhan Pamuk is instructive.

To respect the humanity and religious freedoms of minorities is not to suggest that we should limit freedom of thought on their behalf. Respect for the rights of religious or ethnic minorities should never be an excuse to violate freedom of speech. We writers should never hesitate on this matter, no matter how ‘provocative’ the pretext.

Pamuk’s ‘crime’ was to validate the existence of genocide against the Armenians in 1915-17 when official Turkish policy is to deny it. Pamuk survived but his fellow writer Hrank Dink, who also features in Another Sky, was not as fortunate. He was murdered by a right wing death squad while awaiting trial on charges of having referred to the 1915 massacre of Armenians as genocide. Depending on whom the victims are Holocaust denial is encouraged in some regimes and affirmation punished by death.

Writers need to be able to think freely and not become automatons pushing a pen in the service of some political project. That is for bureaucrats not creative artists. The Zimbabwean Culture minister at one point in time got the notion into his head that writers should only write ‘socialist novels and plays.’ The type of dull world he wanted literature reduced to in which the main characters would address each other as comrade’ has little appeal – apart perhaps for dullards. And then because no one else would be allowed to write there could be no criticism of what is written and the situation would perpetuate itself. Imagine how rapidly a cultural environment would atrophy were that to be the ethos driving it. Thankfully Orwell gave us an all too vivid feel for that type of system and as a result its attraction has morphed into repulsion in the eyes of writers of all hues.

Not that rejection of the Cultural minister’s proposal made Zimbabwe a secure inkwell for pens. Chenjerai Hove outlining censorship in the country described its police as referring to journalism as ‘the crime of practicing journalism.’ While many of the writers in this anthology are well outside of their normal geographic environment, Hove made an important point about what constitutes exile. In order to be exiled one does not need to be banished from the country but merely denied the right to participate in its affairs.

It is not just far off places, alien to the West, that draw the ire of Another Sky. Documented in these pages is the experience of Cheikh Kone who fled the Ivory Coast and ended up in a detention centre in Freemantle Australia. There the conditions were atrocious and Kone describes how one prisoner attempted suicide by leaping from a tree. As he prepared to make his jump he cried in a voice containing both despair and cynicism, ‘I don’t want Australia anymore. Thank you, Australia, thank you, everybody.

On release Kone received a bill for $89,000 to cover the costs of his detention. He summed the experience up:

Between adolescence and adulthood a political ideal called democracy caught my attention. Amidst the mosaic of ideas that offered themselves I quickly became an advocate of this ideal, believing in its great strengths. After spending almost three years in an immigration detention centre in a so called democratic country, I don’t know what to believe in anymore.


Whatever you believe keep saying it.

Another Sky: Voices of conscience from around the world. Editors, Lucy Popescu and Carole Seymour-Jones. London: Profile Books.

Friday, May 29, 2009

The Beautiful Game

It was less a great game the other evening and more a beautiful one sided display of football. It would be a truism to say that the best team won, so it is more accurate to say the only team won. Barcelona’s 2-0 victory over Manchester United, dispossessing Alex Ferguson’s men of their Champion’s League trophy was a treat to watch. Lionel Messi and his colleagues were like dainty Spanish ballerinas up against the cumbersome pork pie eating champions of England. They passed the ball in front of their opponents' noses with exquisite skill. They pirouetted, danced and glided effortlessly past an opposition that seemed rooted to the spot. Every now and then I expected Ferguson to turn the handles like gamesters do when they are playing table football as a means to get his team moving. They exuded the appearance of traffic cones placed on the pitch for nothing other than allowing Barcelona to claim they at least had something to take the ball around.

Last year's European championships in Switzerland and Austria showed Spain to be the new force in European football. Barcelona issued a statement of intent that they intend to carry that flame for some time to come. Their destruction of Manchester United was so complete, causing us to feel that we were watching full time professionals against post men just out for the runabout when not on their day job.

Alex Ferguson is a brilliant manager, probably the best ever to have managed an English team. But in Rome he failed to manage brilliantly. The Stadio Olimpico was host to sheer exhibition football. The much anticipated battle between Ronaldo and Messi proved to be nothing of the sort. Watching it was like looking at Darcey Bussell dancing around a donkey; professionalism over petulance; silk over sulk.

As a Liverpool fan, I was hardly disconcerted or disconsolate at Manchester United’s defeat even if baffled by the paucity of their performance. It is just part of the rivalry that carried me through 17 years in prison – not once did I have to put up with United winning a league championship much to the chagrin of the Man U supporters who were pretty vociferous in the jail. I have a friend who, each time Liverpool lose or United win, sends me a text. When a goal is scored during the games by United or against Liverpool he sends me the name of the scorer. On Wednesday he seemed to have lost the dexterity of his fingers. I waited all night and nothing came through. I held off until a few minutes from the end, Barcelona were two in front and there was no way back for United before sending him a wind up text. I had learned my lesson from ten years ago when in the same competition United trailed Bayern Munich in injury time. I was sitting watching the game in Southampton and with only minutes remaining I sent a text to poke a friend in Belfast. It had hardly left the phone when United were leading 2-1. He never let me forget it. Trying to live that down made me determined not to repeat the same error.

It was a joy to get the latest friend's response. It can’t however be shared, not being suitable for public airing particularly if children are still up and about. Odd that they should take it so bad. And me, seeking to offer only commiseration, am baffled by his accusation that I was gloating. At Manchester United’s misfortune? Never.

Wednesday, May 27, 2009

How Very Dare You

Things don’t get easier for Catriona Ruane. Since becoming minister for education in the Stormont executive her incumbency has neither been marked by success nor panache. Often said to be serviced by the executive’s least able team of ministerial advisers her performance has at best been lacklustre. The handling of the academic transfer procedure has been an unmitigated disaster and her latest brush with adversity can only nudge her party colleagues towards the conclusion that she is a liability who puts the dull on any shine that the performances of other party members serving as ministers might give off.

Catriona Ruane really has no answer to allegations that she was out of order by taking her 12 year old daughter on a three day visit to Cyprus on school time. Ruane was speaking at a seminar on diversity and equality in the country having been invited there by the Reconstruction and Resettlement Council of Cyprus. True, many parents would have done likewise. On more than one occasion I took kids on holiday during their school term. It is probably true that Ruane’s child gained more from three days in Cyprus than she would have from the equivalent time spent at school. On a parental level Ruane may even be praised for giving time to her daughter in a pace dictated working world where children are often casualties of their parents’ schedule. ‘I as a parent, as a mother, made the decision to take my daughter with me, I stand by that decision … I am happy that my decision was both responsible and correct.’ As a mother perhaps but as a mother serving as a minister it is a different story.

The Achilles heel of Ruane is in her own ministerial guidance that parents should not take their children on holidays during the school term. This opens her up to an array of criticisms which she should have taken on the chin rather than resort to her party’s time honoured tactic of seeking to bully the interviewer asking the difficult but appropriate question.

It is bad enough that politicians don’t do their job. If broadcasters follow suit and fail to do theirs then society will know nothing about what those who govern get up to. Seamus McKee of the BBC stuck doggedly to his guns and rightly persisted with his questioning despite Ruanes’s attempts to accuse both him and the Irish News, the paper which broke the story, of gutter journalism. She sought to silence public discussion of a matter of public concern by telling McKee that it was disgraceful that her daughter would be brought into a discussion. The Belfast based paper she accused of launching a "dreadful attack" on her family. She said private matters should not be brought into "political battles".

In fact it was not her daughter at all who was being discussed but Ruane’s own behaviour in disregarding the guidelines she expects others to follow. In his riveting book On The Brinks former blanket man Sam Miller made the point about prisons being run by people who make rules they rarely obey. Seems to be the same in government. Ruane has ended up sounding less like a government minister trying to be taken seriously and more like Derek Faye, the gay character from a Catherine Tate sketch, with oleaginous voice to match, protesting 'how very dare you' to anyone suggesting that he is gay.

In addition to having dropped the ball in the Cyprus incident there is a further tackle, long called foul, which she has now ruled onside by her Cyprus defence. Mick Fealty drew attention to this in his Slugger O’Toole blog: Ruane now leaves herself in a weak position regarding the shambolic education system she presides over. Having just introduced the concept of choice on the basis of ‘parent knows best’ there will be no shortage of opponents and critics lining up to remind her of this in relation to academic section.

Saddest of all perhaps is that Ruane through her foolishness allowed a much more important issue than trips to Nicosia to be sidelined; the withdrawal of funding by the Irish government from an autism school in Armagh. The children there have lost more than most last week and a chance to publicly discuss it was ceded through a severe bout of efficiency deficit.

Monday, May 25, 2009

The Buggerhood

Hell is paved with priests' skulls - Saint John Chrysostom

Consider the following extract from an Irish Times editorial.

The Report of the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse is the map of an Irish hell. It defines the contours of a dark hinterland of the State, a parallel country whose existence we have long known but never fully acknowledged. It is a land of pain and shame, of savage cruelty and callous indifference … The instinct to turn away from it, repelled by its profoundly unsettling ugliness, is almost irresistible. We owe it, though, to those who have suffered there to acknowledge from now on that it is an inescapable part of Irish reality. We have to deal with the now-established fact that, alongside the warmth and intimacy, the kindness and generosity of Irish life, there was, for most of the history of the State, a deliberately maintained structure of vile and vicious abuse.

Hard to take in?

The Report of the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, otherwise known as the Ryan Report, is only hard to take in for those who had no inkling that worse existed than the report actually revealed. For those familiar with the rape of children by Catholic clerics there is nothing surprising about the report, anger-inducing as it undoubtedly is.

As the Irish Times charges, ‘abuse was not a failure of the system. It was the system.’ The congregations were like a legion of the lecherous let loose by a rapine and rapacious Catholic Church and set upon the impoverished young of the nation; an army of child rapists endowed by the government with the power of unaccountability which they used at every turn to abuse the young. Clerical child rape has become as Irish as the potato. It is a national disgrace which we are condemned to carry like a hump on our backs. Abroad we will not be known for our hunger strikes or aid to the world’s poor, but for our rape of children. Thank you, bishop.

There should be no equivocation; the Catholic Church in Ireland was at the heart of this phallic phalange. It was an accomplice before and after the fact. It aided and abetted, covered up, withheld information, perverted the course of justice. Has there ever been a body of men in the history of this country more purpose built than the Catholic Church for mass rape? It is fitting that a memorial be established to the abuse victims. But it should be a meaningful one, not a token. The dissolution of the Catholic Church in Ireland would be appropriate. It would defeat the purpose if dissolution were to be imposed from above. It should come from within the church itself as a genuine, rather than forced, statement of disapproval. Those who care about children should simply leave this vile institution. They can find their god or Jesus elsewhere. Faith is self sustaining, relying little on substance to continue its existence. Why would it need the substance of a church to survive? The supposed loving Christian god would not be seen within a mile of the Irish Catholic Church. If Jesus was to approach a Catholic church it would be for the same purpose that he approached the temple in the biblical tale – to clear the clerics out of it.

How society still allows the Catholic Church, an anti-child institution, to have any control over schools beggars belief. A much better option for society than permitting Church involvement in the education of our children would be to insist that all clerics in a 500 yard vicinity of a school or a playground should first wear a bell which they must ring to alert youngsters of their presence. I happen to agree with neither bell ringing nor Church involvement in schools but if I was forced to choose between the two I would prefer the bell ringing as better practice.

Christian Brother industrial schools were slave rape colonies. The brothers could have the best of both worlds; sexual gratification and financial remuneration. Moreover, just about anybody it seems could walk in off the street, demand their boy and be supplied with one by the clerics. Every paedophile in Ireland must have felt they were going to the sex equivalent of Iceland where the offer was ‘bugger one, get one free.’

The law is indeed an ass. It seems amazing that organisations like the IRA or UVF have an illegal status when the Christian Brothers is a legal body that people are permitted to join. Amazingly, there is no legal sanction whatsoever against membership of a rape gang.

Furthermore, it seems criminal lunacy for the government to be introducing new gang busting measures but no church busting measures. Surely, if ever eavesdropping was justified it would find a receptive audience if the agencies of the state were to bug the conversations of clerics. They could also declare membership of the Christian Brothers a criminal offence. There are indeed serious reservations from a civil liberties point of view about such measures. But the government’s decision to prioritise some criminal enterprises and not others is a sign of where its values lie. And it is clear from The Report of the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse that children ranked well down the value scale.

Blasphemy? Jail me.

Saturday, May 23, 2009

A Shifting Narrative

Sometime during the week I listened to a lively BBC Radio Foyle debate between former Provisional IRA prisoners, Richard O’Rawe and Raymond McCartney. The discussion focussed exclusively on the events of early July 1981 when the republican hunger striker Joe McDonnell was close to death. O’Rawe’s position has been consistent in that he has never deviated from his claim that the Provisional leadership rejected a decision by the prison leadership to accept a British offer that would have ended the strike, thus ensuring no further loss of life. McCartney, a member of the 1980 hunger strike team, has been no less consistent than O’Rawe in his rejection of this account. For him any offers that were made were fatally compromised by the refusal of the British government to provide adequate specification for the means of their enactment.

Before the debate started I was firmly of the opinion that O’Rawe’s version of events was correct. I have long felt that there was a more authentic ring to his claims than to the dismissal of those claims by his critics. Not just because on other issues I have heard many of those critics not infrequently deny the most obvious and try to argue that black was white, but because on all of the occasions that I have discussed the matter with O’Rawe over the past decade he was so thorough and methodical in his marshalling of the evidence and appeared to have no reason to make it up as his detractors sometimes like to suggest. I have also had the opportunity to discuss the matter with some of those opposed to him. And while I never sensed that they were being dishonest in what they said to me I was never with them frequently enough to allow their arguments to grow on me. And some of those who waged their critique of O’Rawe on radio and TV tended to sound like hectoring bullies more intent on silencing him than allowing him to make any case.

In spite of that I tried not to let my prejudice shape my hearing of the Radio Foyle exchange. I could not deny that I knew from experience that McCartney would put party before accuracy. He did this in AP/RN comments hostile to both Tommy Gorman and me after we had accused the Provisional IRA of killing Joe O’Connor of the Real IRA in October 2000. He made the charge that we were guilty of fabrication. Yet I remained willing to listen as fairly as I could to any case that he might make against O’Rawe and judge it on its merits and not on the baggage and bias from yesteryear.

After the debate I concluded that nothing had emerged during it that would cause me to rethink my view on it. If persuasiveness was to be measured in points awarded for content, tone and conviction, then O’Rawe won the exchange. His argument had an internal coherence not so pronounced in McCartney’s. His delivery was weak however and McCartney scored significantly in the way listeners heard things rather than what they actually heard. In the end conviction gave O’Rawe the majority verdict. He spoke as if he was genuinely convinced of what he was saying. This corresponds to a wider view out there which holds that O’Rawe, rightly or wrongly, memory serving him or failing him, at least believes what he has to say. McCartney while presumably believing his own account seemed to lack the passion of O’Rawe in making the argument. He came across more like a politician defending a position which may have been right or could have been wrong but which needed defending nonetheless.

Central to McCartney’s critique was reiteration that O’Rawe’s argument had been persistently demolished by almost anyone challenging him. Hyperbole has long been a feature of McCartney’s discourse, at one time making itself manifest in a suggestion that Ian Paisley serving as First Minister in the Stormont Executive was a gigantic step toward a united Ireland. On this occasion the paradox seems to have escaped him that he is taking part in a radio debate seeking to demolish an argument that he feels was demolished four years ago. Moreover, if the dissection of O’Rawe has been so thorough that it has effectively demolished him, why has the haemorrhaging of support been away from the McCartney perspective and not from O’Rawe? No one, we are aware of, who believed O’Rawe at the start disbelieves him today. The same cannot be said for those who initially believed his detractors. There is a growing body of opinion rowing in behind O’Rawe - who initially fought his corner without much help from seconds – in stating that the Sinn Fein leadership has a case to answer.

Another dubious assertion employed by McCartney is his dismissal of O’Rawe on the grounds that his book Blanketmen was serialised by the Sunday Times which according to McCartney was behaving atrociously during the hunger strike. The very fact that his own party is in the executive bed with the DUP means that positions held by people in 1981 have little bearing on how they are to be viewed today. The DUP’s problem in 1981 was that all of us in the H-Blocks did not die. None of that has prevented Sinn Fein from aligning with the Paisleyite outfit.

In recent months Danny Morrison has argued robustly about the sequence of events that took place in and around the H-Blocks on the 5th of July 1981. And because Morrison has been so precise he has unwittingly helped narrow the debate down, for those trying to make sense of claim and counter-claim, to one issue. That is whether the conversation that O’Rawe claims took place between him and the IRA’s prison leader Brendan McFarlane did in fact happen. It was in the course of that conversation, if O’Rawe is correct, that both men agreed to accept an offer from the British government conveyed to them via Morrison. If O’Rawe establishes that the crucial conversation took place it is effectively game over in terms of any argument against his credibility and motives. Raymond McCartney seems to be the only person in the opposition camp so far capable of grasping this. During his debate with O’Rawe he moved to offset any credit that might accrue O’Rawe’s way in the event of evidence supporting the Blanketmen author's claims regarding the conversation between himself and McFarlane emerging.

My own view, given the evidence that I have seen, is that O’Rawe will be vindicated. Up until now O’Rawe’s shifting of the narrative pertaining to the 1981 hunger strike away from the Sinn Fein leadership has been incremental. That could change substantially if witness evidence in particular emerges from the wing O’Rawe was on at the time of the disputed exchange between himself and McFarlane. In that event there might follow a decisive shift in the battle for control of the hunger strike narrative which could see O’Rawe’s account move into pole position.

What a turn up for the hunger strike books that would be.

Friday, May 22, 2009

Good Friday Review: Republicanism Since Good Friday

Ed Walsh from the Irish Socialist Network reviews a new book on Irish Republicanism since the Good Friday agreement.
"If the outcome has been so dismal, why has the Adams leadership been able to maintain its support and marginalise opposition? One answer is that they have stamped on dissenters ruthlessly. McIntyre documents the social pressure and violent intimidation brought to bear on critics of the leadership – especially in West Belfast, the cockpit of the movement."

Republicanism since Good Friday
Ed Walsh from the Irish Socialist Network reviews a new book on Irish Republicanism since the Good Friday agreement.
Frontline, March 2009

Since the early days of the peace process, former IRA member and Long Kesh prisoner Anthony McIntyre has carved out a role for himself as a witty and perceptive critic of the path followed by Gerry Adams and his comrades. This collection of articles spans the whole period from the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 to the eve of the Sinn Féin-DUP power-sharing deal in 2007. There is no major event that escapes McIntyre’s attention, from the arrest of the Colombia Three and the outing of Freddie Scappaticci as a British agent to the Northern Bank robbery and the murder of Robert McCartney. Any socialist or republican who is pondering the question “what now?” will benefit from reading McIntyre’s book.

Sunningdale for slow learners

One of McIntyre’s most insistent themes is that the Provos have settled for a deal that was on offer from the time of the Sunningdale Agreement in 1974: a continued British presence in the six counties of Northern Ireland as long as the majority remains pro-Union, with a power-sharing government that includes nationalist ministers, based on a re-charged Stormont assembly. He ridicules the claim that the GFA should be seen as a transitional phase on the way to a united Ireland. According to McIntyre, the agreement sets the seal on a comprehensive British victory in the conflict:

“The objective of the British state was to force the Provisional IRA to accept – and subsequently respond with a new strategic logic – that it would not leave Ireland until a majority in the north consented to such a move. It succeeded.”

If the terms accepted by Gerry Adams in 1998 were available from the mid-‘70s, that calls into question the legitimacy of the entire IRA campaign. McIntyre certainly thinks so, warning that “historians of the conflict … will in all probability come to view the IRA campaign much more negatively than may have previously been the case – a sad denouement to an unnecessary war in which so many suffered needlessly”. Although it contains a strong element of truth, this view deserves some qualification. While the Provos hardly gave fair wind to the Sunningdale Agreement at the time when it was signed, they weren’t the ones who destroyed it. That honour belonged to a far-right Unionist alliance headed by Bill Craig and Ian Paisley, whose violent coup against Brian Faulkner’s government was handled with kid gloves by the British Army and the RUC (something that would have been unthinkable if nationalists and republicans had launched a similar challenge to the authority of the British state).

In his IRA memoir Killing Rage, Eamon Collins recalled the impact which the collapse of Sunningdale had on his political thinking: “The unionists’ destruction of the power-sharing experiment – with the seeming collusion of the British Army – had convinced me that they were not prepared to compromise … I can look back now and say that if power-sharing had worked, I would not have ended up in the IRA.” It’s also worth noting that while Margaret Thatcher was in power, there was little prospect of any negotiated settlement between London and the Provos – even if the latter had been willing to abandon many of their key demands, the “Iron Lady” wanted total victory.

That said, McIntyre has little trouble showing the huge gap between what the IRA said it was fighting for (especially at the time of the hunger strikes), and the deal it finally accepted. All along he predicted that the Provos would end up decommissioning their full arsenal and supporting a police force whose role is to uphold British laws. McIntyre’s blunt, sceptical analysis has proved to be much closer to the mark than the comforting words of the Sinn Féin leadership (he dubs their approach to demands from unionism and the British state “never but will”, with yesterday’s unthinkable departure becoming today’s courageous move).

The trouble with guns

Decommissioning proved to be the central issue in the peace process from the time the GFA was signed until the IRA announced its full disarmament in 2005. Unionists cited the absence or inadequacy of decommissioning as the main reason for their reluctance to share power with Sinn Féin. Naturally this has prompted a lot of “Kremlinology” about the motives of the Provo leadership. Did they move as far and as fast as they dared, held back only by the fear of a split within the IRA? Or did they cynically spin out decommissioning for as long as possible, hoping to provoke divisions within the unionist camp and strengthen their own position at the expense of the SDLP in the meantime?

McIntyre’s view of this question seems to have evolved over time. In a 2000 article, he leaned towards the first perspective:

“Adams has not made the leap presumably because he feels he could not hold republicanism intact … ultimately the leaders do what they can get away with before their respective bases pull them back into line … given the virulent opposition of the Republican base to any form of decommissioning, one key leader breaking ranks and launching a public assault on the leadership’s position may be the catalyst that could lead to a divide from which could emerge a new force with more credibility than either the Real or Continuity IRAs.”

By the end of 2001, things appeared in a different light to McIntyre:

“Some commentators and politicians, while accepting the bona fides of the Sinn Fein leadership regarding its commitment to getting rid of IRA weaponry, nevertheless felt that the grassroots acted as a constraint on the leadership’s freedom to manoeuvre. But how could such an intellectually cauterised and strategically moribund body of people act as a brake? … For quite some time the Adams leadership had been free of any internal constraint … it was merely waiting on the opportune juncture to cash in the guns.”

While it is impossible to be certain about these things, McIntyre is surely over-stating the case. He argues convincingly throughout this book that the Provo leadership managed grassroots opposition to changes in policy by gradually shifting course, one step at a time, without explaining what the final outcome would be until it was a fait accompli. Their goal at all stages was to avoid a split. More than once, McIntyre refers to Ed Moloney’s book A Secret History of the IRA as a reliable source: if Moloney is to be believed, the Adams leadership only remained in control of the IRA by the skin of their teeth after the breakdown of the first Provo ceasefire in 1996. Decommissioning was an especially raw, emotional issue for republicans, bringing in its wake the implication that British Army guns were more legitimate than IRA weapons. It seems likely that Adams and co. would have erred on the side of caution.

Another factor which McIntyre doesn’t mention was surely at work too – the fear that even if they dismantled their entire war machine, the Provos would still have to watch David Trimble lose the leadership of unionism to Ian Paisley. The republican leadership may have wanted to keep their guns in reserve as a bargaining chip when the time came to break bread with the Doctor.

The Short Strand UDA

If that was the plan, it was on the verge of being fulfilled at the end of 2004 before talks with the DUP collapsed. The next month saw the biggest crisis for the Provos since the GFA was signed, as the Northern Bank robbery was quickly followed by the savage murder of Robert McCartney. While the robbery was an act of breath-taking tactical stupidity, handing the DUP the mother of all sticks to beat Sinn Féin with, most socialists will tend to feel intensely relaxed about theft from the filthy rich (as Brecht once remarked, what is the crime of robbing a bank compared to the crime of owning one?).

The Short Strand killing was a very different matter. Some of the angriest and most eloquent writing in this collection is dedicated to the subject. McIntyre recalls the help he and his IRA comrades received from people in the Short Strand during the Troubles, and compares the “republican” killers of Robert McCartney to the infamous Shankill Butchers. While he does not hold the IRA leadership directly responsible for McCartney’s murder, he accuses them of tolerating a culture of arrogance and brutality among “ceasefire soldiers” who used the name of the IRA to lord it over their neighbours:

“During the armed conflict with the British state, IRA volunteers could never have endured were it not for access to myriad resources provided by the local population. The community had to be treated with respect, otherwise it would never have taken the risks it did to help sustain the armed struggle … today many in the IRA have lost their way. The need for immediate community support is not pressing. There is no quid pro quo between IRA volunteers and the community dictated by necessity. Certainly, Sinn Féin needs votes and cannot afford to have Republicans standing on the toes of the electoral base. But a vote in a year or two’s time does not have the same disciplinary or constraining effect on an IRA volunteer as would the need to have access to someone’s kitchen or wall cavity within which a weapon can be concealed.”

Policing and power-sharing


In the aftermath of McCartney’s murder and the bank robbery, the Provos came under intense pressure to decommission their weapons without any deal being struck in advance. The essential pre-condition before the DUP would enter a power-sharing government was Sinn Féin’s endorsement of the PSNI, which duly followed in 2007. McIntyre dismisses the arguments put forward in support of that move with some shrewd comments about the nature of policing and the limits of reform. It is naïve to imagine that a police force can be transformed if enough individuals join with the right intentions: “The individual exchanges his or her own identity for an institutional one. They may start out sporting their new institutional dimension only as a mask, but invariably the mask absorbs and constitutes the face.” Having shifted ground so radically, Sinn Féin now has a vested interest in glossing over abuses by the PSNI, for “if those most opposed to the police join them, then in a bid to minimise criticism of their decision they shall seek to minimise criticism of the police”.

Working-class communities may be plagued by anti-social behaviour and random violence, but those problems will not be solved by backing the police force of a capitalist state, which has very different priorities:

“Actions that threaten to destabilise the political equilibrium, no matter how marginally, will be robustly dealt with, whereas more serious actions that damage the well-being of a working-class community will accumulate by the hundred with minimal police intrusion … why would the British police be successful in curbing anti-social behaviour in Belfast but not in Liverpool, Glasgow, or Birmingham? … the type of crime that plagues working-class communities from Limerick to Liverpool, from Cork to Cardiff, from Belfast to Bolton, fuelling a generalised fear and immiserising numerous lives is largely impervious to modern policing. Working-class communities need a multi-agency approach that is supported by more resources rather than more rozzers.”

But there is no chance of that approach, based on radical reform to change the social conditions of working-class people in Northern Ireland, being adopted by the power-sharing government – whether or not Sinn Féin and the DUP get past their bickering. There has been so much focus on whether unionist and nationalist parties could agree to share “power” that the limited extent of that power has usually been overlooked. The Stormont administration gets its budget from London and has to work within those limits. It could not eliminate poverty even if it wanted to. The British government has made it clear that it intends to reduce the amount of money it sends to Belfast. So the climax of the republican struggle has become the opportunity to introduce cuts in public services on behalf of the British state, providing a convenient buffer between those affected and those ultimately responsible.

McIntyre tells a bitter anecdote that suggests how little has really been achieved:

“Who would have thought that when Brendan Hughes lay in a bed in a prison hospital leading the 1980 hunger strike, fellow Blanketmen would two decades later visit him in the Royal Victoria hospital where he lay on a hospital trolley because there were no available beds? The British health minister at the time was a member of the Provisional movement.”

Brendan Hughes himself put it this way when interviewed by McIntyre: “I look at South Africa and I look at here and I see that the only change has been in appearances. No real change has occurred. A few Republicans have slotted themselves into comfortable positions and left the rest of us behind.”

Out of the ashes?


If the outcome has been so dismal, why has the Adams leadership been able to maintain its support and marginalise opposition? One answer is that they have stamped on dissenters ruthlessly. McIntyre documents the social pressure and violent intimidation brought to bear on critics of the leadership – especially in West Belfast, the cockpit of the movement. Such methods have not only been used against members of rival republican groups whose aim is to re-start the war against Britain (some of whom have been killed by the Provos since 1998). Dissenting figures who oppose a return to armed struggle – such as Tommy Gorman or McIntyre himself – have found threatening mobs of Adams supporters surrounding their homes. In an interview with McIntyre, former hunger striker Richard O’Rawe describes his experience after he challenged the official narrative of the H-Block campaign in his book Blanketmen:

“They needed to bring me down from the status of former Blanketman to the level of the gutter, where it would be all the easier for people to kick me as they passed by. They had to ensure that I was something people would kick off their shoe. Right from publication day, I was persona non grata, someone who was to be ostracised. The smears started. People who I had been friends with avoided me. A former cellmate on the blanket refused to speak to me. Friends I had all my life blanked me out and made it clear when I went to a pub that I was not welcome in their company. All the president’s men cut the tripe out of me on television, radio, newspapers – anywhere they had the chance.”

The effect of such intimidation cannot be underestimated. But it is telling when O’Rawe still maintains that “like or dislike Gerry Adams, he has to be given credit for ending the unwinnable war”. That is surely the main reason why Adams has remained in command of the movement despite all the policy somersaults and tout scandals of the last decade. There is no desire for a return to armed struggle in the communities that supported the Provos from 1970 to 1994. Two decades of military pressure couldn’t force the British state out of Ireland, and a return to the battlefield can only end in failure. At one point McIntyre writes that the IRA’s current strategy, however limited its achievements, “has been infinitely better than continuing to fight a futile war for the sake of honouring Ireland’s dead yet producing only more of them”. Wise words – but they have not been taken on board by many of the best-organised opponents of the current Provo leadership, who still appear to think that a return to war will deliver the elusive goal of a 32-county republic.

McIntyre does not support that quixotic approach himself. His own proposals for the way ahead are sketchy. McIntyre’s main argument seems to be that a new form of organisation based on grassroots democracy is needed: “If republicanism re-emerges, let it be democratic rather than elitist. Army Councils only ever lead us to despair or disaster.” That is well said, but if the liberation sought by republicans is to have a class content, it has to be defined in explicitly socialist terms. The world is full of republics where the class divide has remained immune to pledges of “liberty, equality and fraternity”. A real “Ireland of equals” will only emerge when the economy has been brought under social ownership and control. Otherwise working-class people will continue to wait on hospital trolleys in miserable corridors, whether they are in Belfast, Dublin or Cork.





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Monday, May 18, 2009

Defining Dissidents

Today The Pensive Quill carries an article by guest writer, Liam O Ruairc, on the topic of dissident republicans.

Defining Dissidents by Liam O Ruairc

If it easy to identify those that the media refers to as ‘dissident republicans’ (1) it is far more difficult to identify and define what they mean by ‘dissident republicanism’. For example, a major reference book such as Sydney Ellliott and W.D. Flackes’s Northern Ireland: A Political Directory 1968-1999 (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1999) contains no entry on ‘dissident republicanism’, although it has entries on Republican Sinn Fein-CIRA and 32csm-RIRA. Similarly on the internet, a major academic website such as CAIN carries nothing that helps to answer the question. Surprisingly , the clearest definition is to be found in Wikipedia:

"The term "dissidents" has become the primary term to describe Irish republicans who politically continue to oppose the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 and reject the outcome of the referenda on it.” (2)

In this sense theirs is an “opinion which is contrary to a majority decision” and therefore a form of “dissent”. But is it republicanism that they dissent from? A recent article in the Irish Times made the following point:

"There is still the view among a minority that the 1998 Good Friday agreement was a betrayal of 1916 Irish republicanism. It accepted, however temporarily, a unionist "veto" and continued British "occupation" of Northern Ireland. That minority view, of the Good Friday agreement as a "sell-out", is consistent with the attitude of the Provisionals in the 1980s, of the IRA during the Border Campaign of the 1950s, and of the anti-Treaty side in the Civil War. It is also in line with the views of the men and women of Easter 1916." (3)

So it is clear that it is not 1916 Republicanism that they dissent from, therefore the expression ‘dissident republicanism’ to describe Republicans opposed to the Belfast Agreement is incorrect. Republicans opposed to the 1998 Belfast Agreement are no more ‘dissidents’ than republicans opposed to the 1921 Treaty were ‘irregulars’. Jonathan Tonge refers to them as ‘Republican Ultras’ (4) but does not specify why their position is ‘ultra’ compared to their predecessors. Richard English prefers the term ‘dissenters’ to that of ‘dissidents’ and define them as “ people who sharply disagree with Provisional orthodoxy about the evolving peace process ” (5) But here again it is not Republicanism that they dissent from. Republicans opposed to the Belfast Agreement are ‘mainstream’ or ‘traditional’ republicans, not ‘dissidents’. In fact, as a Newsletter editorial noted some time ago, it is in the ranks of the Provisional movement that the real ‘dissident republicans’ are to be found:

“Sinn Fein also needs to sort itself out. The irony is that it is Adams, McGuinness et al who are the real dissident republicans, because they are the ones who have reached an accommodation with unionists and the British Government. They are the ones who have abandoned the abstentionist policy. They are the ones who have legitimised partition.(6)

When they are not referred to as ‘dissidents’, Republicans opposed to the Belfast Agreement are sometimes branded as ‘criminals’ and were even recently described (as he stood beside the head of the PSNI) as ‘traitors’ by Martin McGuiness (who did not see the irony in that he is a British Minister serving the interests of the Crown). Such characterisation is widely off the mark. In a letter to the Irish News, former blanketman Padraic Mac Coitir (not close to so-called ‘dissidents’) criticised the use of the term ‘traitors’ by Martin McGuinness to describe such groups:

“From Thomas Ashe who died on hunger strike in 1917 right through the 1920s, 1940s and 1950s men and women protested in British gaols against being branded as criminals. During those years the IRA had little support and were castigated from the pulpit and by others who claimed to be the true heirs of the 1916 Proclamation. Because the IRA of that era didn’t have an electoral mandate they were wrong to engage in armed struggle – that was the well-argued opposition to the republican activists. But for all their criticism, no-one in the nationalist republican camp then ever referred to the IRA as ‘traitors’. Some of the Sinn Fein spokesmen who recently referred to today’s so-called dissidents as criminals were themselves in gaol fighting criminalisation by embarking on protest and hunger strike in the 1970s. Following the noble example of the people of that earlier struggle I won’t brand anyone with offensive tags which can never be retracted. But I can’t help reflecting sadly on the prevailing and shameful scent of sheer hypocrisy. ” (7)

When the media does not call republican organisations opposed to the Belfast Agreement ‘dissident’, they tend to refer to them as ‘republican splinter groups’. Qualifying these organisations as ‘breakaway factions’ and ‘splinter groups’ is also problematical. They certainly were the product of splits, but on a closer study of those splits in 1986 and later in 1997, whether they can be defined as ‘splinter groups’ is debatable.

In September 1986, for the first time since 1970, the Provisional IRA held a meeting of its supreme decision-making body, the General Army Convention. The Convention discussed dropping abstentionism. Abstentionism was firmly established in the Constitution of Oglaigh na hEireann (IRA) and a two thirds majority was required to change it. The policy was set out in Section 1: “ Participation in Leinster House, Stormont or Westminster is strictly forbidden and in any other subservient Parliament, if any. Any volunteer who, by resolution proposes entry into Leinster House, Stormont or Westminster automatically dismisses himself from membership of Oglaigh na hEireann. ” (8) Sinn Fein had a similar constitutional bar. Section 1b of the Sinn Fein Constitution stated: "No person ... who approves of or supports the candidature of persons who sign any form or give any kind of written or verbal undertaking of intention to take their seats in these institutions, shall be admitted to membership or allowed to retain membership." (9) The 1986 General Army Convention was able to make the constitutional change 75 per cent for and 25 per cent against. Similarly at the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis on 2 November 1986 delegates voted 469 to 161 to abandon the abstentionist policy regarding Leinster House. Therefore given that there appeared to have had a majority vote those who opposed the constitutional change and went on to form Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity Army Council are referred to as a minority splinter group.

This characterisation can be challenged on a number of grounds. People opposed to the change in the Constitution argued that changing the IRA’s Constitution required two separate Conventions. At the first, embargoes specifically forbidding participation in Leinster House, Stormont or Westminster would have to be removed from the Constitution. Only then, at a second Convention, could a mention on entering parliament be voted on. Therefore, the IRA Constitution had been breached. Those opposed to the changes in the Constitution were supported by the outgoing Army Executive. A majority on the Army Executive had voted against the proposals for dropping abstentionism. The Army Executive then rejected the decision to end abstentionism as anti-constitutional, dismissed those who supported the new departure for breaching the existing IRA Constitution and co-opted new Executive members and elected a Continuity Army Council as it held the necessary ‘continuity’ of authority. Furthemore those opposed to constitutional change claimed that the 1986 General Army Convention had been gerrymandered by the setting up of new IRA organisational structures for the Convention without which there would not have been the necessary two-thirds majority required to change the IRA Constitution. (10)

Something similar happened in Sinn Fein. According to section 1b of the Sinn Fein constitution in 1986, proposals supporting entry into Leinster House were banned. Before the Adams leadership put forward a motion to enter Leinster House, they needed to change section 1b by a majority vote. They did not do so, thus broke the existing Sinn Fein constitution and rules. Opponents of the motion also claim that the vote at the ardfheis was gerrymandered : in 1986 the number of votes at the ardfheis, which reflects the size of Sinn Féin, almost doubled from 1985 to 1986, and then reverted to the 1985 level in 1987. (11) The traditionalists claim that they did not split and form “a new breakaway movement” (12) -they kept the old one intact. (The word 'Republican' was added to Sinn Fein to emphasise the republican beliefs of the party.) To speak of “the formation of a new party” in 1986 is incorrect. (13) It was the others who broke away from the IRA and Sinn Fein, not them. They thus claim not to be some “rival organisation” (14), but to be THE authentic Republican Movement.

The IRA that had accepted the constitutional changes in 1986 underwent a significant split with the emergence of the so-called 'Real IRA'. The RIRA emerged from a conflict between IRA Army Council and Army Executive in 1996-1997. (15) In October 1997, the majority of the Executive argued that signing the Mitchell Principles represented a direct infringement of the IRA’s constitution, challenged the IRA’s right to use force and hold arms and constituted a de-facto recognition of the unionist veto. As a result of the unconstitutionality of Mitchell Principles, the Army Council’s failure to ratify the 1997 ceasefire, the army council’s treatment of the executive, the poor morale within the organisation six members of the Executive resigned on 23 October. (16) In November 1997 they held a meeting in a farmhouse in Oldcastle, County Meath were they re-organised Oglaigh na hEireann as the “ true ” (17) post-1986 IRA as the Constitution had been breached. (18) They were therefore the ‘real’ IRA. Recently, a new Oglaigh na hEireann emerged. It is not clear how the group justifies its title. It does not justify its existence in terms of the IRA Constitution and its ideology and politics are unclear. (19) The legitimacy of its title is therefore questionable.

Republicans opposed to the Good Friday Agreement therefore cannot be defined as ‘dissidents ‘ in ideological terms. Nor can they be defined as ‘splinter groups’ in organisational terms, the CIRA having grounds to be the authentic pre-1986 IRA and the RIRA being the true post-1986 IRA. However, Danny Morrison, who does not mind the Provo label (20), challenges their claim to be the authentic republican movement "because they refused to go along with or respect the opinion of the majority" of the movement. (21) They are minority groupings. He recently argued in a letter that "those republicans opposed to the political process which emerged from the peace process are thoroughly outnumbered by the diametrically-opposed views of other ex-lifers, ex-blanket men, former women prisoners and ex-hunger strikers in support of Sinn Fein policy. ... This minority is actually saying to the men and women who served imprisonment for their beliefs -you have no right to make up your own minds about strategy or the way forward..."(22) What weakens his argument is that there are remarkable similarities between the 1969-1970 and the 1986 and 1997 splits. The Provos had also 'refused to go along with or respect the opinion of the majority' of the Official IRA and a minority had walked out of the Army Convention on 13-14 December 1969 and at the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis on 11 January 1970. (23) Did that make them 'dissidents' or a minority splinter group? Does the fact that they were 'outnumbered' (24) make their claim to be the republican movement less authentic and less legitimate? Did that imply that they were telling people 'who served imprisonment for their beliefs' such as Sean Garland, Liam McMillan, Seamus Costello or Cathal Goulding that 'you have no rights to make up your own mind'? Like the later ‘dissidents’ of 1986 and 1997, the early Provisionals claimed that they hadn’t split and formed a new organization -they had kept the old one intact. Ruairi O Bradaigh made a point which applies to 1969/1970, 1986 and 1997: 'no splits or splinters -long may it remain so provided we stick to basic principles'. But when it comes to rules and principles being ignored, 'the minority is going to expel the majority'. (25)



NOTES

(1) BBC website, Who are the dissidents?, 10 March 2009
(2) Wikipedia: Dissident Republicanism It is important to note that opposition to the Belfast Agreement does not automatically entail support for the continuation of a military campaign. It is not the 'peace' they oppose, but the 'process'.
(3) Seamus Murphy, It is time to leave behind 1916 and the 'forever' war, The Irish Times, 12 May 2009
(4) Gerard Murray and Jonathan Tonge, Sinn Fein and the SDLP From Alienation to Participation, London: Hurst & Company, 2005, 219
(5) Richard English, Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA, London: Macmillan, 2003, 315 and 318
(6) Editorial, Political stalemate - here we go again, The Newsletter, 1 September 2008
(7) Padraic Mac Coitir, Sinn Fein are treading dangerously close to hypocrisy, The Irish News, 21 March 2009
(8) Brendan O’Brien, A pocket history of the IRA from 1916 onwards, Dublin: The O’Brien Press, second edition, 2004, 110
(9) Wikipedia: Republican Sinn Fein (This Wikipedia entry is very good)
(10) Robert W White, Ruairi O Bradaigh: The life and Politics of an Irish Revolutionary, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006, 309-310 ; Peter Taylor, The Provos: the IRA and Sinn Fein, London: Bloomsbury, 1998,, 361-362 ; Brendan O’Brien, op.cit, 112-113. See also J. Bowyer Bell, Republican IRA: An emerging secret army, Saoirse, September 1996.
(11) Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, revised and updated edtion, 2007, 296
(12) Richard English, op.cit, 251
(13) Gerard Murray and Jonathan Tonge, op.cit, 162
(14) Peter Taylor, op.cit, 291 and 361
(15) Ed Moloney, op.cit, 450-454
(16) Ibid, appendix 4, 609-612
(17) Peter Taylor, op.cit, 355
(18) Ed Moloney's book reproduces the post-1986 IRA constitution, indicates the ammendements and areas of dispute between the Army Council and the Army Executive. op.cit. 602-608.
(19) Allison Morris, Dissidents: 'We have recruited ex-Provos', The Irish News, 16 February 2009
(20) Danny Morrison, When one doesn’t mind being called a Provo, Daily Ireland, 6 September 2006
(21) Danny Morrison, A time to build trust, The Observer, 22 April 2001
(22) Danny Morrison, The vast majority of those who risked life and liberty for the republican cause are still with the Sinn Fein leadership, The Irish News, 31 March 2009
(23) Sean Swan, Official Irish Republicanism 1962 to 1972, Lulu, 2006, 320-322
(24) Cfr. Brian Hanley and Scott Millar, The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA and the Workers' Party, London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 2009
(25) Robert W. White, op.cit, 151 and 293

Politics Over Truth

If you ever injected truth into politics you would have no politics - Will Rogers

Reflecting back over a number of pieces written on truth and reconciliation in the North the one conclusion I am being pushed to is that it will be a long time, if ever, before either take root there. While a wide range of reasons may help explain why this is so, it does seem inescapable that one crucial factor not to be overlooked is the continuing presence on the political scene of those considered perpetrators. Not until they become fossilised curiosities, a subject of cultural memory rather than an open sore of grievance, will the ground settle firmly enough to allow something as robust as truth or reconciliation to take roots that hold.

The unionists and the British have an advantage here. Most of their key players in fuelling and maintaining the conflict have either shuffled off elsewhere or have assiduously covered their tracks so that people don’t place them at the heart of violent political conflict. Who, apart from a few with a sense of history, recall the role of Peter Robinson as leader of the paramilitary wing of the DUP? Who even speaks of the DUP having been linked to an armed militia? Conversely, Sinn Fein’s links to the IRA don’t seem to fade with the passing of time? The discourse of the chattering classes has Sinn Fein alone being gradually weaned away from political violence. The other main players are treated as if they were uncontaminated by it.

This places a handicap on Sinn Fein. Its leaders’ reluctance to stand aside from the positions of power they have wielded for decades is an impediment to the party lending forward momentum to the call for truth.

We need look no further than a claim in the Irish News by Tom Kelly that the attendance by Gerry Adams at the launch of Eames-Bradley was ‘unnecessarily provocative.’ What reconciliation emerged from the allegation thrust into his face by a woman that he had murdered her parents? It is not necessary to be critical of Gerry Adams, or to subscribe to the view that he was involved in the killings referred to by his accuser, to appreciate that he is seen by many as having been a chief victim maker. Moreover his continued denial that he was ever a member of the IRA merely mocks the concept of truth. It signals to others from whom truth is being demanded on behalf of the many republican and nationalist victims of the conflict, that there is no need on their part to respond; that Sinn Fein is not serious on the matter but merely grandstanding. All of which ensures that Bairbre de Brun’s criticism of Eames-Bradley doesn’t make it over the first barrier to truth hurdle: ‘Eames-Bradley is proposing the creation of a legacy commission appointed by the British government to report to the British government who was a primary combatant in the conflict.’

She is right of course. The British have been a primary combatant in the conflict. But so too was her boss. That however seems a truth that she can not acknowledge. It also means that truth in reality has to be either parked or manipulated into an organised truth, the latter being the option most likely to be favoured by those who prefer power before people.

The current Sinn Fein position of trying to appear all things to all people has a paralysing consequence – everybody will demand everything from you. The party’s abandonment of its earlier demand for peace with justice in exchange for peace with reconciliation has left it anchorless. Had it continued to stand four-square as a partisan defender of the community it represents then its calls for truth about the role of the British state in the armed conflict would not sound so hollow. But because it wants its leaders to pose as statesmen, floating above the normal run of the mill politics, it has become susceptible to demands that it can never deliver. It is the role played by current Sinn Fein leaders in the armed conflict that acts as the ubiquitous tripwire preventing any smooth journey away from the past. They cannot afford the truth to come forth. Do they really want society and the wider world to know what operational decisions the deputy first minister took in his former job as IRA chief of staff? Does the DUP even want anybody to know? Or at this stage the Brits? Not a chance. And if neither the Brits nor the DUP want the truth to come out about the role of Martin McGuinness there is not the slightest possibility that they will want it out about any of their own. It is clear what the trade off will be; how little the organised truth will resemble what truly happened.

For Sinn Fein the difficulty is further illuminated by the challenges that force it to adopt a stance that to most observers appears wholly inconsistent. It calls for openness about British state complicity in the deaths of Irish citizens but has never seriously made any demands for transparency in the case of the British spy, Freddie Scappaticci. When first exposed in the media six years ago the prominent British agent found to his delight that the party he had spied on was proving more loyal to him than he ever was to it. It is a strange moral universe where his activities in collusion with the British state against Irish people are judged to be somehow less reprehensible than Brian Nelson’s.

All of which underlines how a hierarchy of victims is always at play, how it functions, demotes and discriminates. In Sinn Fein’s hierarchy some victims of the British state deserve justice and their cases should be fully investigated. Other victims, such as those awarded the unwanted status by Scappaticci and his ilk merit much less clarity. They are undeserving victims because politics intervenes and it is not politically expedient for the truth about Scappaticci to emerge because of the damage it might do to senior figures in Sinn Fein. If there really was no such hierarchy all victims would have the same rights.

Sinn Fein’s present position is in constant need of being fire-walled from the past of its leaders. History here is written from the perspective of the present. With such leaders at the helm the future will be as truthful as the fictitious past.







Thursday, May 14, 2009

Good Friday Review: "Speaking Truth to Power"

Liam O Ruairc reviews Good Friday: The Death of Irish Republicanism for The Sovereign Nation.
"[...] what can be done? For McIntyre, repeating Vaclav Havel's call to speak truth to power and Milan Kundera's point that 'the struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting'. The articles contained in this book are an excellent instance of speaking truth to power and a poignant example of “the awesome power of Republican memory to triumph over those who wish to forget what they inflicted and those who conveniently want us to forget what it was all about.”"

"Speaking Truth to Power"

Liam O Ruairc,
The Sovereign Nation,
May, 2009

For Ed Moloney, former IRA lifer turned writer Anthony McIntyre is “the most persistent, thoughtful, incisive, troublesome and penetrating” critic of the peace process. The vast majority of the articles contained in this book first appeared on the now defunct The Blanket website. As the backcover description of the book accurately and succinctly puts it:

“It is a contemporaneous commentary on the peace process and the Good Friday Agreement, before the spin masters could have their version of history received as the established wisdom. (It) challenges the standard (Provisional) Republican narrative and is a much needed historical document for anyone wanting to understand the Irish peace process from an Irish republican perspective.”

As McIntyre makes it clear on a number of occasions, it is not the 'peace' he is opposed to, but the 'process'. The peace process might include republicans but from the very beginning excluded republicanism. The Belfast Agreement does not represent some 'stepping stone' to a united Ireland, “on the contrary, it is a stumbling block to the unification of the country”, as Provisional republicans now officially accept that there will be no change in the constitutional position of the six counties without the consent of a majority there. The whole thing is less a case of chickens coming home to roost and more one of Turkeys celebrating Christmas, and therefore McIntyre is adamant that “Turkeys should not be celebrating Christmas”.

For McIntyre the difference between what Good Friday Republicanism achieved and the objectives Easter Sunday Republicans died to secure is the difference between the politics of a Free Ireland and the politics of Free Presbyterianism. “We are all Sticks now,” concluded the late John Kelly, as republicans without republicanism simply are constitutional nationalists. In the 26 counties, the choice is between Provisional Fianna Fail and Real Fianna Fail, and people in the 6 counties can now choose at Easter between two sticky parades shouting 'Up Stormont !' at each other.

That does not mean that McIntyre is advocating the continuation of armed struggle.

“Genuinely taking the gun out of Irish politics would be a step forward. Taking the dignity and defiance out of Irish republicanism is a step too far.”

That step too far is analysed at length throughout the book.

“A revolutionary body that settles for and then seeks to legitimise the very terms it fought against simultaneously delegitimises and arguably criminalises its own existence.”

By accepting the Good Friday Agreement, the Provisional movement settled for less than what had been offered to Nationalists at Sunningdale in 1973, an offer Republicans had rejected then.

Therefore not only has the Provisional campaign ended in strategic failure, but it raises the question of what has it all been for.

“Not only will Republicans be consigned to administer British rule for the foreseeable future, the acceptance by them of the principle of decommissioning has served to delegitimise and criminalise the previous Republican resistance to that rule. It also elevates to a higher moral plateau British state weaponry. Basically Republicans are being told that the weapons used by Francis Hughes, the deceased hunger striker, to kill a member of the British SAS death squad are contaminated in a manner which the weapons used to slaughter the innocent of Bloody Sunday and the victims of shoot to kill are not. Replacing the slogan 'SS RUC' by 'Yes, Yes, RUC - It's the force to set us free!'”

is the humiliating consequence of the Provisional's acceptance of British policing.

“Things have been inverted so much that those who once called Pearse Jordan 'comrade' have no destination but that certain day when they shall address those who killed him as 'colleague'.”

This was inevitable given that the Provos could not have ministers making laws while at the same time refusing to recognise the force supposed to implement them.

That also means that the Provisionals will have to support the repression and criminalisation of Republicans still engaged in physical force resistance against the British state.

“Activities Sinn Fein previously demanded be rewarded with political status will now have to be termed criminal in order to maintain the fiction of the PSNI as a service engaged exclusively in civic policing. From shouting 'Up the Ra! Jail Paisley!' the Provos are now shouting 'Up Paisley! Jail the Ra!”

As all the above illustrates,

“no informer throughout the course of the conflict has been able to deal such a blow to the military capacity of the IRA as its own leadership has: At the risk of oversimplifying, the minister's job is to shaft republicanism; that of the agent is to shaft republicans. While few outside the ranks of the purists would call McGuinness a rat on this basis, there is no clear blue ideological sea between minister and agent.”

Republicanism has been destroyed from within. How was this possible? The leadership of the Provisional movement has been very skilled at managing its base. As Ed Moloney reminds us in his foreword, it was through “secrecy, lies and duplicity” that Adams was able to manoeuvre his base.

Brendan Hughes bitterly remarked in his interview with McIntyre: “The political process has created a class of professional liars and unfortunately it contains many Republicans.”

Before it was about dying for Ireland, now it is about lying for Ireland. In this context, McIntyre emphasises that “it is important that we continue to reassert what we believe to be the truth”.

But if grassroots Republicans are 'the most politicised community in Europe' as they allege, how were they not able to see through the lies and duplicity?

Secrecy, lies and duplicity have been facilitated by the fact that people are more loyal to the movement than to the aims of the movement. (“The Republican leadership has always exploited our loyalty,” remarked Brendan Hughes); therefore republicanism is whatever the leadership says it is. 'Loyalty to the Big Lad' is stronger than ideology and political consciousness. It is an instance of the old social democrat maxim that 'the movement is everything and the principles nothing'.

McIntyre is very angry at what Ed Moloney calls “the bovine complacence” of the Provo rank and file for staying silent in the face of such outrageous and obvious deception. McIntyre proposes that the IRA rename itself the IBA - 'I Believe Anything'.

As for those who do not believe anything but remain silent, McIntyre notes: “We live in a world where many are more afraid of being isolated than they are of being wrong. Consequently, they take the easy option and are content to be wrong.”

Critical questions will lead to social ostracism, as Richard O Rawe can testify after he challenged the Provo's version of the 1981 hunger strikes. “To his credit, being wrong was more repulsive to him than being isolated.”

The same goes for McIntyre and his partner: for speaking out and defending critical thought, they were vilified, shunned by the community and a mob of Provos picketed their home. He documents at length cases which show that when isolation and ostracism by the community are not sufficient, it is suppression and intimidation that the Provisionals will use against those opposed to their political project.

“Rite of passage from a position of radical critique to one of conservative entrenchement involves undergoing a certain ritual. Stamping out former comrades is like a symbolic public act if circumcision whereby the radical boy becomes a conservative man -- the bloody and sharpened knife has to be brandished in order to demonstrate that the snip is complete.”

The book is strong when challenging some of the dominant interpretations of the political developments of the last ten years and offering an alternative perspective informed by what the author believes are the core values of Provisional republicanisn: “defence, defiance and dissent”.

However McIntyre's contention that republicanism is a spent force is more debatable. For McIntyre, it was particular British policies, not the British presence in itself which fuelled the development of provisional republicanism. While the book is a clear product of “defeat, decommissioning and disbandment”, it is much too early to say that it is the “death of Irish Republicanism”. There is still political space for Republicanism, even if it is reduced from what it once was.

Viewed from a longer historical perspective, it is possible to make the case that it could grow if the conditions are right. Until that moment what can be done? For McIntyre, repeating Vaclav Havel's call to speak truth to power and Milan Kundera's point that 'the struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting'. The articles contained in this book are an excellent instance of speaking truth to power and a poignant example of “the awesome power of Republican memory to triumph over those who wish to forget what they inflicted and those who conveniently want us to forget what it was all about.”





Good Friday, The Death of Irish Republicanism
is available at these online outlets:
Ausubo Press; Online Bookshop at Queens, Small Press Distribution.

You can also order directly from Gill & Macmillan:
Email sales@gillmacmillan.ie

Are you a bookseller looking to stock Good Friday?
Call or Fax your order to: Tel: +353 1 500 9500 or Fax: +353 1 500 9599

Gill & Macmillan is now the exclusive distributor in Ireland and the UK If the book is not on the shelves of your local bookstore,
ask them to order it for you!

Wednesday, May 13, 2009

AC Grayling and Free Speech

Free speech is fundamental because without it one cannot have any other liberties. One cannot claim or exercise one’s other liberties, or defend them when attacked; one cannot defend oneself when accused, or accuse those who do one wrong; one cannot have democracy in which information views and policies are expressed, debated and challenged; one cannot have education worth the name, if there are things that cannot be said; one cannot express one’s attitudes, needs, feelings, responses, anger, criticism, support, approval or beliefs; one cannot ask all the questions one needs to or would like to; and for all these reasons, without free speech one would be in a prison made of enforced silence and averted thought on important matters – AC Grayling.

The push for free speech is in a state of perpetual motion. Sometimes the term seems contradictory given that speech is rarely free, coming with costs which the censors are trying to raise all the time in their bid to price it out of the marketplace of ideas. Censorship is invariably an assault on democracy in that it seeks to deny the public access to information with which it might make more informed decisions. The totalitarian alone, whether of the right or the left, thinks that there is a one size fits all perspective which everybody should be squeezed into. Something is pronounced this or that and no further discussion is needed. They are never short of reasons as to why this must be so yet deny the means by which it can be tested – the raising of a critical alternative opinion – and so serve to deny their pronouncement any validation other than coercion, physical or otherwise. It is ultimately self-defeating in that the very lack of validation adds momentum to the drive for free speech which the totalitarians are so hostile to from the outset.

It makes no sense to think that those who favour free speech agree with the content of that speech. That would mean agreeing with everything that is said. Who in the world does that? Free speech advocates merely think that something is better said than suppressed. As the British philosopher and humanist AC Grayling argues in outlining the dangers of the power to silence:

give any government, any security service, any policing authority, any special interest group such as a religious organisation or a political party, any prude or moraliser, any zealot of any kind, the power to shut someone else up, and they will leap at it with alacrity.

How often have we been forced to bear witness to that in the course of our lives?

In politics and religion in particular there is a definite willingness to argue that free speech is not an absolute. From that foothold and guided by that logic the push against free speech expands relentlessly to the point where the censor acquires absolute power over what is said or not said. What is really meant by free speech not being an absolute is that free speech is to be absolutely abhorred.

About three years ago I was once asked would I place limits on free speech. My answer was:

Well, my personal view is, ‘would I say anything that would directly lead to your death?’ No, I would not. Of course there are boundaries in that sense. Nevertheless, I am totally distrustful of the ‘Free Speech, but…’ school. .. what I tend to do is identify with a purely ‘Free Speech’ impulse and I’m always looking for ways to push out the boundaries and expand ‘Free Speech’. There are enough people trying to impose boundaries as it is, so I don’t go looking for them. I accept that ‘Free Speech’ is not an absolute, but I don’t go searching for the limits. That’s the vocation of the censor not the writer.

It was more of a holding answer. I had not at any time sat down to consider the parameters in any great detail. I realised that the Achilles heel of the free speech perspective was any claim for absolutism on its behalf. It is a position so inflexible that it lacks the suppleness to meet the challenge posed by nuance and special circumstance.

In a very insightful piece in Index on Censorship, AC Grayling dealt with the question of how the absolute exists in relation to free speech. Grayling is the most lucid of thinkers and his ability to explain concepts is simplicity itself.

Because it can do harm, and because it can be used irresponsibly, there has to be an understanding of when free speech has to be constrained. But given its fundamental importance, the default has to be that free speech is inviolate except … where the dots are filled in with a specific, strictly limited, case-by-case, powerfully justified, one-off set of utterly compelling reasons why in this particular situation alone there must be a restraint on speech. Note the words specific strictly limited case-by-case powerfully justified one-off utterly compelling this particular situation alone.

That seems to me to be the caveat that functions as the paradox keeping free speech virtually inviolable by denying it the arrogance of absolutism. Or put more simply, it is the exception that proves the rule. And without that rule the Tom Stoppard humour no longer seems so humourous: 'I agree with everything you say, but I would attack to the death your right to say it.'

Tuesday, May 12, 2009

Good Friday Review: Days Like These

Sam Millar reviews Good Friday: The Death of Irish Republicanism for Verbal Magazine.
"Despite its academically-inclined leanings, readers should not be put off, as the book is compulsive reading and offers at times a very accessible insight to the key events and personalities which have shaped the contemporary history of the Republican Movement from the early 70s to present day."

They haven’t gone away, you know…or have they? Sam Millar finds out in this insightful new book by a former Republican prisoner.

Verbal Magazine


When a book boasts a monumental declaration such as the death of Irish Republicanism, it had better stand up to scrutiny.

And so it was with relish I tucked into Anthony McIntyre’s Good Friday, seeking not a full dinner, but at least some tasty morsels. McIntyre is a former republican prisoner, imprisoned for killing a loyalist paramilitary. He took part in the Blanket Protest against the criminalisation of political prisoners in the H Blocks. Upon his release, he finished his PhD at Queen’s University, Belfast, and went on to become the blogger of the now defunct The Blanket. It’s from this website that most, if not all, the contents of his book - or diary - originate. For his outspoken and mostly articulate comments against the leadership of Sinn Fein, he was hounded, ostracised and even had his house picketed on numerous occasions, sometimes by former comrades, other times from rent-a-mob gangs – most of whom had never got their hands dirty during the bloody conflict.

The book starts rather shakily with a foreword from Ed Maloney in ‘New York’ dubiously informing any uneducated observer that the war waged by the IRA lasted for the best part of three decades and ‘produced a death toll of over 3,500…’ Puzzlingly, there is no mention of loyalist or security force involvement in that grisly death toll.

Thankfully, once Ed is sent back to ‘New York’ and McIntyre takes the helm, the sailing becomes a bit smoother – albeit not for republicans, I should hasten to add.
Despite its academically-inclined leanings, readers should not be put off, as the book is compulsive reading and offers at times a very accessible insight to the key events and personalities which have shaped the contemporary history of the Republican Movement from the early 70s to present day.

The book is most absorbing when it details happenings we think we’re familiar with: The Hunger Strikes, the brutal murder of Robert McCartney, Decommissioning, The Colombia Three, Stakeknife and, of course, The Good Friday Agreement. They are all there, critically analysed in a concise voice.

At times the book reads like a Shakespearean tragedy peppered with Greek irony; other times it reads like The Diary of Samuel Pepys or Orwell’s prophetically brilliant Animal Farm. Granted, the heroes are few in the inner pages, but there is a grand mix of Machiavellian villains headed by ‘The Big Lad’ and ‘Tombstone Tom’, respectively better known by their nom de plumes, Brownie and Liam Og. I will leave it to the discerning reader to uncover their true identities.

The author’s opinions will interest those looking for an alternative to the uncritical party voice of Sinn Fein, or those wishing to gain an insight into the machinations of life inside that organisation. Some within the breathing republican family will no doubt scoff at the idea of being classified as dead. Only time will tell if Doctor McIntyre’s grim prognosis of The Republican Movement is accurate or if, to paraphrase Mark Twain: its death has been greatly exaggerated, once again…

Good Friday: The Death of Irish Republicanism is an important book, gripping, honest and revelatory, it’s one that probably will not find it’s way onto Gerry Adams’ must-read list. It should, however, be on yours.


Read more by Sam Millar at http://www.millarcrime.com.





Good Friday, The Death of Irish Republicanism
is available at these online outlets:
Ausubo Press; Online Bookshop at Queens, Small Press Distribution.

You can also order directly from Gill & Macmillan:
Email sales@gillmacmillan.ie

Are you a bookseller looking to stock Good Friday?
Call or Fax your order to: Tel: +353 1 500 9500 or Fax: +353 1 500 9599

Gill & Macmillan is now the exclusive distributor in Ireland and the UK If the book is not on the shelves of your local bookstore,
ask them to order it for you!

Monday, May 11, 2009

Hate Fire

Once more, cowards came in the dark of night and attacked my home in an attempt to intimidate me and my family - Mitchel McLaughlin.

The petrol bombing of nationalist homes looms large in the memory of those old enough to have witnessed the events of August 1969 that gave rise to the Provisional IRA. Loyalists engaging in it was bad enough. That republicans may be involved in the same type of activity forty years later is a serious indictment of those still locked in to the failed politics of physical force republicanism. And if this is what is on offer – an Ireland in flames – there should be no sense of awe at republicans once again being pushed out to the margins of society where they stand like the farmer in the empty field who puts up a sign saying ‘don’t throw stones at this sign.’

Mitchel McLaughlin is an elected Sinn Fein politician. Whether his critics like it or not he has been elected to the Stormont assembly to represent the people who put him there plus those within the constituency who did not elect him but whose interests he must serve nonetheless. That he has views and policies that differ from many republicans may be galling to those opposed to him. That is no excuse for attacking his home with petrol bombs, endangering his life and the lives of his wife and son. If this attack differs in any way from hate crime could somebody come forward and explain to the rest of us just what the difference is?

Mitchel McLaughlin described the attack on his home as attempted murder. Even if we do not know the intent behind those who threw the devices in the direction of his bedroom windows it would be foolhardy or disingenuous to deny that death is always a possibility when such lethal cocktails are hurled at premises housing human beings. Three petrol bombs were not thrown merely to scare the Derry politician. Mr McLaughlin believes that were it not for the intervention of a neighbour the outcome could have been much more serious. There is no reason to feel he is wrong.

In recent times other Sinn Fein homes have been attacked including that of Daithi McKay a North Antrim MLA. There was some division of opinion within the journalistic community as to who were behind the spate of incidents, some suggesting local hoods. But with each passing attack the suspicion has grown that some of Sinn Fein’s republican critics bear responsibility. This has been reinforced by language from the Real IRA both to Panorama journalists and in the organisation’s Easter statement which can only be interpreted as threats to Sinn Fein leaders, particularly those that serve in a ministerial capacity in the Stormont executive.

Those who physically attack and threaten Sinn Fein members are unlikely to listen to Sinn Fein criticism of their actions. If the Real IRA is behind the attacks as suggested by Martin McGuinness then his challenge to Derry republican Gary Donnelly to explain what such attacks will do for Irish unification is likely to fall on deaf ears. But if Mr Donnelly is in a position to persuade those behind the attacks to desist then he should listen to republicans not involved with the Sinn Fein project. Last month the Republican Network for Unity expressed strong disapproval of any physical actions directed against Sinn Fein. They described such actions as ‘wrong, misguided and serving no useful purpose’ and from which those culpable should ‘immediately desist.’

I know Mitchel McLaughlin fairly well. While I like him there is not much in the way of politics that I would agree with him on. And I would not stand in the way of anyone attacking him politically. But none of this prevents me from taking a stand in his defence against these outrageous attacks on him and his family. When people like him are attacked I am on their side and totally at odds with their assailants.

The torching of political opponents is a practice we associate with the middle ages when people could be described as witches and burned at the stake. It is not the type of thing we expect from something that describes itself at republicanism in the 21st century.

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