Honorable Compromise or Republican Versailles?

Today The Pensive Quill carries part four of an article by guest writer Liam O Ruairc on Irish Republicanism and the Peace Process

HONORABLE COMPROMISE OR REPUBLICAN VERSAILLES?
Liam O Ruairc

On 10 May 1998 at a special Sinn Fein conference in Dublin, 331 out of the 350 delegates present voted to accept the Belfast Agreement. The Provisional movement claims that the Belfast Agreement does not represent a defeat for Republicanism. Danny Morrison, former Sinn Fein publicity director, claims that the British couldn't defeat the IRA nor could the IRA defeat the British, so the IRA did not win but had not lost either. (79) That is demonstrably wrong.

"The political objective of the Provisional IRA was to secure a British declaration of intent to withdraw. It failed. The objective of the British state was to force the Provisional IRA to accept - and subsequently respond with a new strategic logic - that it would not leave Ireland until a majority in the North consented to such a move. It succeeded." (80)

The Provisional movement claims that the Belfast Agreement does not represent a defeat but a honorable compromise. In the words of Gerry Adams:

"I'm recognising, quite clearly, that the Good Friday agreement is a compromise, it's an accommodation, it couldn't be anything else. The seismic shifts in republican theology, if I can use that term, was to argue for a negotiated settlement… and explicitly arguing for a negotiated settlement means that you're prepared to settle for less than your objectives at that time. But our objective of a united Ireland remains and we continue in a different mode of struggle to try and achieve that." (81)

The problem is less that it is a compromise than the fact that it is a bad compromise. (82) Agnes Maillot is therefore wrong to write that for Republicans "compromise is equated with betrayal". (83) As a matter of fact revolutionary movements, as Lenin showed long ago, do not emphatically reject all compromises. (84) There is such a thing as "revolutionary realpolitik". (85) It is wrong to frame the republican critique of the Belfast Agreement in terms of absolutism. The fundamental problem is that it was Nationalism and Republicanism that did the main compromising.

Danny Morrison reminds us that among the "bitter pills the peace process has required republicans to swallow" are:

"the deletion of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution (the territorial claim over the North); the return of a Northern Assembly; Sinn Fein abandoning its traditional policy of abstentionism; reliance on British-government-appointed commissions on the equality and human rights issues and on the future of policing; and the implicit recognition of the principle of unionist consent on the constitutional question." (86)

He also adds: "Republicans sit in an assembly they never wanted. The British government never gave a declaration of intent to withdraw. There is still a heavy British army presence in some nationalist areas. The police have not been reformed. The equality and justice issues have yet to be resolved." (87)

"Yet" as academics Tonge and Murray point out "Morrison declined to draw from this catalogue of disasters the conclusion that the peace process was an abject defeat for Republicans." (88) To get a measure of how little has been ceded by unionists -- and by implication how much by republicans -- we need only view it through the following prism:

"If, for example, through the Good Friday Agreement, the unionists had signed up to a British declaration of intent to withdraw from the North and a Dublin declaration of intent to annex the six counties, no amount of wordplay and casuistry would have permitted this outcome to be regarded as anything other than a resounding defeat. Small consolation it would have been to them to have won outright on Strand One matters, such as keeping the RUC intact or the prisoners locked up. Unionism would have lost on the great philosophical question of consent." (89)

It looks more like a Republican Versailles than a honourable compromise. For all the Unionist scepticism about the Belfast Agreement, "the Unionists have won, they just don’t know it." (90) "Overall, it would seem that, in terms of the constitutional conflict between nationalism and unionism on the island of Ireland it was the latter that triumphed." (91)

Unionists won on the big philosophical issue. In return for Unionist concessions on power-sharing and an Irish dimension, Nationalism and Provisional Republicanism explicitly signed up to acknowledging that there can be no end to the union without the consent of the majority in Northern Ireland, and that it is legitimate for that consent to be withheld if that is the majority view. "Mr Trimble believes that any nationalist or republican who, accepting the principle of consent, becomes part of the governmental structures within the UK state, is –whatever the genuinely held long-term aspirations- structurally a Unionist." (92)

Mitchel McLauglin admitted in his Parliamentary Brief article (May/June 1998) that the Agreement legitimised British rule; and senior Sinn Fein member Francie Molloy conceded that his party 'are really prepared to administer British rule in Ireland for the foreseeable future. The very principle of partition is accepted.' (93)

As Eamonn McCann writes: "Both Republicans and Unionists will have to leave a lot of historical baggage behind in order to make the Belfast Agreement work, and it’s the Republicans who’ll have to abandon the more valuable items."

That is because while Unionists have stuck to their philosophy, "the Republican leadership have accepted that the Republican analysis is wrong." (94) Therefore Jonathan Powell is right to note:

"The paradox was that it was much harder to sell the Agreement to the unionists than to nationalists and republicans. In many ways republicans had to concede more. After all, if they accepted the principle of consent, that it was for the people of Northern Ireland to decide their future, what had the armed campaign and the suffering been for?" (95)

The Provisional movement has gone much further than a ‘compromise’, an ‘accomodation’ or a ‘negotiated settlement’:

"In endorsing the ‘principle of consent ‘ contained in the Agreement, accepting that Northern Ireland will, as of right, remain part of the United Kingdom until such time as a majority within the six counties decides otherwise, Sinn Fein had ditched the idea that lay at the heart of its own tradition and that had provided the justification in political morality for the campaign, indeed the existence, of the IRA." (96)

VICTORY 2016?

The Provisional Movement argues that the Belfast Agreement nevertheless has a progressive dynamic as it can provide the transitional mechanisms for Irish unity to happen by 2016, the one hundreth anniversary of the Easter Rising. (97) In 2009 Martin McGuiness even said that Ireland could be unified by 2014. "If it doesn’t happen in 2016 then we will be working to make it happen in 2017 or, as I am working towards, 2014 " he said. (98)

For Gerry Adams, by accepting the Belfast Agreement the Provisional movement was entering a "new phase of the struggle": while the Agreement "is not a settlement, it is a basis for advancement", "it could become a transitional stage towards reunification". (99)

Thus, the motion officially ratified by the party at its 1998 Ard Fheis read:

"The Good Friday document is not a political settlement. When set in the context of our strategy, tactics and goals the Good Friday document is a basis for further progress and advancement of our struggle. It is another staging post on the road to a peace settlement. (...) The Good Friday document does not go as far as we would have liked at this time but it is clearly transitional. (...) It can be a basis for pushing forward national and democratic objectives. In short, it allows us to move our struggle into a new and potentially more productive phase." (100)

This rests on two sets of arguments.

In negative terms, the Provisionals argue that it weakens the Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Gerry Adams stated that thanks to the Belfast Agreement, there were no longer any raft of legislation to maintain Northern Ireland as part of the UK, with the British government's repeal of section 75 of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. For Adams thanks to the Agreement, "What has been removed is the veto. The Government of Ireland Act 1920, gave a veto to unionism which was clear and succinct. What you have now is almost, from the British point of view almost like a couple deciding that they're going to divorce." (101)

Martin McGuinness also makes a similar point: "It is a bit like a partner in a relationship saying the relationship is over, but that s/he is willing to wait until the children have grown up. " (102) However, the replacement of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act was legally 'of no significance', rather it reconstructed British sovereignty. (103)

David Trimble, well read in legal matters, from early on had pointed that the legislation governing Northern Ireland’s place within the UK is the Act of Union of 1800 and the 1973 Constitutional Act, therefore the repeal of Section 75 of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act is legally of no significance. (104) Legally, the Agreement does not shift the balance of constitutional forces towards reunification. The only significant constitutional shift went in the opposite direction, the British state retained sovereignty in the North and the consent principle was embedded, whereas Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution were ammended to incorporate the consent principle. Thanks to the framework of the Belfast Agreement, it is the Dublin government, not the British, which has dropped its claim to jurisdiction, leaving Northern Ireland within the UK. The idea that the repeal of section 75 of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act and ammendment of articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution represent some "balanced constitutional accomodation" (105) is an intellectual absurdity.

In positive terms, according to Mitchel McLaughlin: "There is steady demographic, political, social and economic change, undeniably pointing in one direction, towards support for a united Ireland." (106) But do these changes really point in that direction?

The first argument is that demographics show that the Catholics will sooner or later be in a majority position in the North and will vote for a united Ireland at the earliest opportunity. Partition will supposedly come to an end when Catholics reach the magic figure of 51% of the population in the North. However, the idea that a united Ireland could be brought about by demographic change has been highly disputed and dealt a blow by the most recent (2001) census figures. (107) It could be decades before the two communities will have equal numbers and before this translates into votes.

In 2009, academic Dr Brendan O’Leary discounted the idea that Catholics would outbreed Protestants and use their numbers to vote for a united Ireland. The percentage of the Catholic population in Northern Ireland has now stabilised at 40-45 percent and is likely to stay that way for 30 years or more which is as far as anyone is prepared to predict. (108)

On top of that, the 2007 Life and Times Survey showed that 85 per cent of Protestants and 22 per cent of Catholics support Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom. More recently the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey showed that ten years on from the Belfast Agreement, almost one in four Catholics (23 percent) were willing to be tagged under the Northern Irish banner, compared with less than ten percent twenty years ago. (109)

This indicates that more Catholics identify with Northern Ireland , an implicit acceptance of the state of Northern Ireland. Partly for those reasons, senior Irish government sources have stated that they do not expect Northern Ireland's constitutional position to be raised again for "20 to 25 years". The Dublin administration opinion comes after Secretary of State Peter Hain told the Newsletter: "I think that, in a sense, the constitutional question is parked."(110) Moreover, according to the former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, a united Ireland could not be achieved by a simple majority poll in favour of constitutional change. (111)

The second argument is that the development of an all-Ireland economy will create a dynamic towards unification and therefore make partition redundant. According to Martin McGuinness:

"There are a number of identifiable trends leading to Irish unity within a meaningful timeframe. Ireland is too small for two separate administrations…There is a draw towards the greater integration of services, structures and bodies on an all-Ireland basis in order to deliver quality services and economies of scale…These all point towards the realisation of reintegration of both states presently on the island of Ireland into one independent country. " (112)

However, in 2006 Peter Hain, Northern Ireland Secretary of State, made the following comment on the argument that the 'all Ireland economy' is a stepping stone towards a united Ireland: "The interpretation that this is a kind of Trojan horse for a united Ireland is 100% wrong." (113) Economic and constitutional issues are separate. Says Hain:

"It has nothing to do with the constitutional future, that's entirely separate and dependent on the votes of the people and they've decided that through the referendum following the Good Friday agreement; so the border exists constitutionally, but in economic terms it doesn't; in economic terms it's about cooperating across the border and making use of best friends either side."

By way of example, Hain referred to counties Derry and Donegal. It was in the interest of both to be "joined at the hip" economically and for business purposes. However, "the constitutional separation will remain unless otherwise decided by the people." (114) The relocation of Aer Lingus’ Shannon to Heathrow route to Belfast in 2007 because staff based there will receive less pay and fewer benefits than colleagues in the 26 counties also shows that the border can be used as an instrument of economic competition rather than unification. The border with its differential tax and grant regimes can be used as a source for mutual enrichment. (115) According to some analyses, the border even "may have helped boost business ". (116)

The third argument is that the development of cross border institutions will generate a political dynamic towards unification. Cross border bodies cannot and will not lead to reunification and an end to British rule. In his address on 30 September 2000, Martin Mansergh, Northern Advisor to three successive heads of Dublin government and one of the main architects of the peace process, stated that 'there is no evidence, let alone inevitability, from international experience, that limited cross border co-operation necessarily leads to political unification.' Such bodies have existed for decades and have not brought a united Ireland any closer. (117)

Unionists also have a virtual veto on cross-border arrangements. The recent economic crisis also means that North-South bodies are facing the prospect of cash cuts from the Dublin government. Any reduction by Dublin could bring an equal response from the North because the bodies are funded on a 50:50 basis. (118) The economic crisis in the south of Ireland since late 2008 had pushed back the prospect of a united Ireland well into the future.

In June 2009 Martin Mansergh stated that the arguments for a united Ireland were less compelling now. He told the annual conference of the Institute for British-Irish studies that the 26 counties state

"is engaged in a major struggle to maintain, within the EU and the euro zone, its economic viability and sovereignty. It is hardly the moment to press claims to the North which we have renounced, and it has to be said, the advantages and flexibility of joining up with a small sovereign state in the present global turmoil are for the moment a lot less compelling today than they were two or three years ago." (119)

This is why the Provisionals are now more cautious about their predictions of a united Ireland by 2016. In a 2009 interview, Gerry Adams now spoke of a "40-year span" to end partition. (120) "In fact, the dream of a 32-county socialist republic is further away than ever, rejected by the souther electorate and substituted by a power-sharing deal with the DUP under British rule " concluded a Belfast Telegraph editorial. (121) That the Agreement is non-transitional and that republican strategy is no longer designed toward destabilising the northern state which would possess the potential to create transitional structures can both be ascertained from the following exchange between Frank Millar of the Irish Times and Gerry Adams:

Millar: "For wasn't the act and fact of suspension rooted in the legislation establishing a devolved Assembly at all times subject to the authority of the British Crown?"
Adams: "Oh yes, and, in terms of the realpolitik, we have accepted entirely, it's obvious, partition is still here, that the British jurisdiction is still here."
Millar: "Is this a peace process, about reconciliation with the unionists, accepting the existing constitutional parameters until such time as there is consent to change them? Or is Sinn Féin's real game -- struggle continuing by other means -- to destabilise Northern Ireland and show it to be irreformable?"
Adams: "No, that isn't the case, the second scenario isn't the case." (122)

The rhetoric of transition is still there. In 2010 Adams attempted to sell the Agreement at Hillsborough as another "staging post on path to greater equality ". (123) But this was just "diversionary therapy" for Adams’s supporters because the elements dealing with issues such as the Irish language and beefing up North-South co-operation were rather vague and woolly. (124)

SUNNINGDALE FOR SLOW LEARNERS?

Clearly, by its own admission, it is no longer Sinn Fein's intention to destabilise the northern state and seeks to administer it. "Decades of describing Northern Ireland as a failed and illegitimate state ended with Sinn Fein itself providing the legitimacy when it accepted office in the new government." (125) Ironically, it denounces as "traitors" republicans still engaging in armed actions today. (126)

Consequently all the central tenets of traditional republicanism have been jettisoned and those of constitutional nationalism adopted. In making the Belfast and later St Andrews agreements work now, the Provisionals "are working the same basic institutions and arrangements that they worked to undermine more than 30 years ago and refused to accept until very recently. They are also accepting that the SDLP’s policy, analysis and approach throughout the years were correct" declared John Hume. (127) "It should be clear that what they are doing is implementing the policies which have been consistently pursued by the SDLP. The Good Friday Agreement, again heavily negotiated by the SDLP is identical to Sunningdale" he added. (128)

The Belfast Agreement and the later St Andrews Agreement are "Sunningdale for slow learners", to use Seamus Mallon’s famous expression. (129)

In December 1973, the SDLP and the Ulster Unionist party had signed up to the Sunningdale agreement - an arrangement which arguably gave the political parties in Northern Ireland much of what was later on offer in the 1998 Belfast Agreement.

Under Sunningdale, power in the province was to be shared by the Northern Ireland executive, with ministers from both the nationalist and unionist communities, and a cross-border Council of Ireland was created, to stimulate cooperation with the Republic. The IRA emphatically rejected out of hand this constitutional initiative, viewing it as a British attempts to marginalize Republicanism and isolate their struggle. For Ruairi O Bradaigh, the Sinn Fein president at the time, the Sunningdale Agreement 'constitutes a step backwards rather than an advance' for the liberation struggle. (130) The Provisionals opposed the Sunningdale Agreement and when it failed to secure necessary unionist support and was brought down by the May 1974 Ulster Workers’ Council strike, this was praised by the Provisionals. (131) Constitutional nationalists who accepted the Sunningdale Agreement and saw it as a stepping stone to a united Ireland were denounced. (132) Gerry Adams accused the SDLP, because it had endorsed the arrangement, of being the first Catholic partitionist party. (133)

This raises the question of whether the IRA campaign, between its rejection of the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 and the Belfast Agreement of 1998 was justified given that there is, objectively speaking, very little progress towards Republican objectives if the provisions of Sunningdale and the power-sharing executive and the provisions of the Belfast Agreement are compared.

Given the similar nature of the two Agreements how do the republicans justify not accepting the similar terms on offer at Sunningdale 25 years earlier? To this Gerry Adams responded:

"I think there were quite substantive and substantial differences. … In terms of the detail, the institutional and other requirements, the status of the constitution, the equality agenda, and more particularly the inclusive nature of this current process, there have been sizeable differences between what was on offer in '74 and what we negotiated out in more recent times… The detail, the safeguards, the guarantees, the overarching interdependent mechanisms of the Good Friday agreement - we're talking about rights-based legislation, that the equality provision, section 75, is at the core, and permeates every single clause of the Good Friday agreement- are well in advance of what was being offered up in Sunningdale." (134)

However, this is debatable. For example, Austin Currie, a minister in the 1974 power sharing executive actually feels that in many ways the Sunningdale Agreement was a better deal for nationalists than the Belfast Agreement, meaning that the Provisionals finally settled for less than the SDLP got in 1973. (135)

If Austin Currie is right, then Republicans were wrong to reject Sunningdale for accepting the Belfast Agreement. "In the intervening years, 2,000 people were killed. It must be asked, 'whatever for'?" (136) "Over recent weeks the First Minister and Deputy First Minister have addressed that question without providing a coherent explanation" noted the Irish Times. (137)

And if Republicans were right to reject Sunningdale, there logically is little justification for them to accept the terms of the Belfast and St Andrews Agreements. As Bernadette Sands-McKevitt said about her brother:

"Bobby did not die for cross-border bodies with executive powers. He did not die for nationalists to be equal British citizens within the Northern Ireland state." (138)

ST ANDREWS AGREEMENT

Have the ten years since the Belfast Agreement seen progression towards a united Ireland or a further copper fastening of partition and strengthening of the Unionist veto? Professor Roy Foster sums the historical trend in his 2007 book Luck and The Irish: A Brief History of Change 1970-2000 when he writes:

"A dominant theme of Irish history in the last 30 years of the 20th century has been the cementing of partitionism and the institutionalising of 26-county nationalism. At the beginning of the 21st century Northern Ireland is just as firmly entrenched in the UK (maybe more so, in fact) and Ireland as far away from reunification." (139)

After years of trying to implement the Belfast Agreement, St Andrew's Agreement was unveiled on 13 October 2006. (140) The essence of the proposals contained in the Agreement is that if the Provisional movement openly supports the policing and court systems, the DUP will have to share power with them with a DUP First Minister and a Provisional Deputy First Minister in devolved local government.

"So who won and who lost at St Andrews? Everybody's a winner, say the governments. In reality, Sinn Féin made most concessions. The DUP looked genuinely pleased as negotiations closed; despite Sinn Féin's positive words, the body language was wrong. As well as endorsing the PSNI, the party potentially must support MI5 and the British courts, which sits uneasily with republicanism." (141)

According to a DUP Document the St Andrews Agreement makes fundamental changes to the Belfast Agreement and offers from a Unionist perspective "undoubtedly a better package" compared to the 1998 Agreement. It secures:

• Unionists setting the political agenda
• DUP veto over all major decisions
• DUP veto over cross border relations
• Republicans jumping first
• Republican support for the police, the courts, and the rule of British law
• No Sinn Fein policing and justice minister (142)
  

On March 26 2007 the DUP and Provisional Sinn Fein finally agreed to share power. This was compared to a "Hitler-Stalin pact Ulster style" rather than a model for world peace. (143) It is ironic that Provisional Sinn Fein will go down in history as the party who put Paisley in power. Just reading what Danny Morrison was writing about the possibility of the Provisional sharing power with Paisley one year before the restoration of devolution gives a measure of the magnitude of the organization’s political and ideological shift:

"Increasingly I think we must need our heads examined. Just because he represents the largest party might entitle him to be First Minister - but, in truth, who could work with this one-man Executive? He is ill-mannered, arrogant, pompous and bigoted. … What an advertisement he would be around the world. We would be a laughing stock. We would be building on gas. I thank God that Paisley is terrified of being First Minister, and that the DUP by making the North ungovernable within is demonstrating that the North is a failed political entity. Ironically, that was one of the aims of the IRA’s armed struggle. Goodbye Sinn Fein/IRA, Hello DUP/IRA! Republicans should remember that they wanted to bypass a northern assembly and executive and work macro-politically towards unification. Sinn Fein should go back to basics and demand the abolition of the failed assembly. Even though Hain rule is misrule and unrepresentative rule, it is better than Paisley rule. We’ve waited for 800 years, what’s a few more?" (144)

It was not Paisley who had changed: "I did not change, it was Sinn Fein changed. And to be fair to them they have shown a real willingness to do work for Northern Ireland and to support law and order and I believe it." (145)

This is why Ian Paisley could boast with justification: "Monday 26th March was a day of great victory for the unionist people of Northern Ireland. That was the day that republicanism accepted the strength of unionism; that was the day that Irish republicanism adhered to our demands. That was the day that unionism secured its future."

Paisley says that the DUP made Sinn Fein realise "it was the end for republicanism":

"On May 8 Gerry Adams will sit in our Assembly - a British institution of the British state. He will take an oath pledging to support the police, the rule of law and British justice. … The IRA has finally been shunned from the politics of this Province. The DUP will ensure that it never returns." He concluded by saying that the DUP is in control: "Unionists are writing the agenda, we are dictating the pace of change and we are controlling the conditions for government." (146)

Ian Paisley was satisfied that he did "smash" Sinn Fein and that the party could no longer be "true republicans " because they were "in part of the British government ". (147)

For the DUP, Northern Ireland’s place within the Union has been strengthened. "I have not changed my unionism, the union of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, I believe today is stronger than ever" declared Ian Paisley in his inauguration speech as First Minister. (148)

The UVF stated that the reason it intended to go out of business was that "the constitutional question has now been firmly settled" as "the principle of consent has been firmly established and…the Union remains safe." The organisation also "accepts as significant support by the mainstream republican movement of the constitutional status quo." (149)The DUP believes that it has safeguarded Unionist interests through forcing the Provisional movement "to transform and conform" to use the expression of Peter Robinson. (150)

This is because Unionists will have an effective veto on Provo policies, including abolition of the 11-plus, in the new power-sharing executive, according to a leading constitutional expert. Rick Wilford, professor of politics at Queen's University, said changes to the Belfast Agreement made at St Andrews mean that unionists are able to torpedo policies they don't like, such as any attempt to strengthen north-south institutions. 'Under the new rules, if at least three ministers in the executive object to what a minister is proposing in a given department, they have the right to refer that policy to the overall assembly.’

So if the Catriona Ruane wants to abolish the 11-plus just three unionist ministers are needed to veto the policy and refer it to the Assembly. DUP MP for Lagan Valley, Jeffrey Donaldson, said, 'Anything unionists of either party find unpalatable will be referred back to the Assembly. Although there will have to be cross-community support unionists are in the majority and will have the ultimate veto.’(151)

Two years into the current assembly, SDLP MLA Alex Atwood confirmed this fact: "When you look at how the executive is run there is one overwhelming reality and that is the DUP are running government, and SF are running behind. That is the single biggest conclusion about the nature and culture of our government."

Every impartial observer of the political scene agrees that the DUP is the driving force in Stormont. "In that respect you could say from the unionist point of view it is working, from a nationalist point of view it ain’t working." (152) This is why at the end of 2009 an internal DUP document could claim that "unionism is winning" and that "a united Ireland is further away than ever". (153)




NOTES

(79) Danny Morrison, The war is over…Now we must look for the future, The Guardian, 11 May 1998. Martin Mansergh noted that the whole premise of the process was that "no side had ‘won’, no side had ‘lost’, and no side was ‘surrendering’. " (Martin Mansergh, The Future Path of Peace, The Irish Reporter, February 1996, 49)
(80) Anthony McIntyre, Good Friday : The Death of Irish Republicanism, New York : Ausubo Press, 2008, 7
(81) The Nick Stadlen Interview with Gerry Adams, 12 September 2007
(82) Gerry Ruddy, "The Good Friday Agreement –revisited" in Models of Governance: The Good Friday Agreement and Beyond, Coiste na n-Iarchimi, Belfast, 2003.
(83) Agnes Maillot, New Sinn Fein: Irish republicanism in the twenty-first century (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 174
(84) Cfr ‘No Compromises ?’ in ‘Left Wing’ Communism, an Infantile Disorder, V.I. Lenin, Collected Works: Volume 31, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966, 66ff.
(85) Georg Lukacs, Lenin: A Study in the Unity of his Thought, London : NLB, 1970, 72
(86) Danny Morrison, Stretching Republicans Too Far, The Guardian, 13 July 1999
(87) Danny Morrison, Get on with the business of peace, The Guardian, 14 October 2002
(88) Gerard Murray and Jonathan Tonge, Sinn Fein and the SDLP From Alienation to Participation, London: Hurst & Company, 2005, 234
(89) Anthony McIntyre, Modern Irish Republicanism and the Belfast Agreement: chickens coming home to roost, or turkeys celebrating christmas? in Rick Wilford (ed) Aspects of the Belfast Agreement, Oxford University Press, 2001, 217
(90) Paul Bew, The Making and Remaking of the Good Friday Agreement (Dublin: The Liffey Press, 2007) pp. 28, 100
(91) Thomas Hennessey, Negotiating the Belfast Agreement, in Brian Barton and Patrick J Roche (eds), The Northern Ireland Question: The Peace Process and the Belfast Agreement, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 55-56. David Trimble himself wondered whether the scale of his victory might not be too great to the point where the Provisional leadership might not be able to endorse the 1998 deal. (Dean Godson, Himself Alone: David Trimble and the Ordeal of Unionism, London: Harper Collins, 2004, 326-334 and 347)
(92) Paul Bew, The Making and Remaking of the Good Friday Agreement (Dublin: The Liffey Press, 2007), 61
(93) Quoted in Liam Clarke and Michael Jones, Trimble shows more flexibility over IRA arms, The Sunday Times , 28 March 1999
(94) Eamonn McCann, War and Peace in Northern Ireland, Dublin: Hot Press Books, 1999, pp. 236-239
(95) Jonathan Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland, London: The Bodley Head, 2008, 109
(96) Eamonn McCann, Historical Handshakes do not reflect street-level reality, The Sunday Business Post, 8 April 2007. For example Mitchel Mc Laughlin, Towards 2016 - A United Ireland, An Phoblacht-Republican News 22 August 2002
(98) Claire Simpson, 2014 ‘could be date for Irish unification’, The Irish News, 10 April 2009
(99) 'Preparing for a new phase of the struggle': Presidential Address by Gerry Adams, An Phoblacht-Republican News 23 April 1998. See also Gerry Adams, Agreement has delivered change, The Irish Times, 2 April 2008.
(100) Resolution Number 1, Ard Chomhairle Paper to 1998 Sinn Fein Ard Fheis,special supplement to An Phoblacht-Republican News 7 May 1998
(101) The Nick Stadlen Interview with Gerry Adams, 12 September 2007
(102) Martin McGuinness, Negotiating an Agenda for Change : Keynote Address on Negotiations and Agreement to Ard Fheis, An Phoblacht-Republican News, 23 April 1998
(103) B. Hadfield, The Belfast Agreement, Sovereignty and the State of the Union, Public Law, volume 15, Winter 1998, 615
(104) Thomas Hennessey, The Northern Ireland Peace Process : Ending the Troubles?, Dublin : Gill&Macmillan, 2000, pp.139-145
(105) British and Irish Governments, Propositions on Heads of Agreement, London: Prime Minister’s Office, 1998 (available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/hoa12198.htm)
(106) Rosie Cowan, Census hits republican hopes, The Guardian, 20 December 2002
(107) Cfr. Malachi O Doherty, Breeding schemes, The Guardian, 13 April 2001 for a refutation of the theoretical basis of the demographic argument and Rosie Cowan, Census hits republican hopes, The Guardian, 20 December 2002 for an empirical refutation of the figures on which it is based.
(108) Liam Clarke, Irish unity is not top of any immediate agenda, The Newsletter, 16 June 2009
(109) Ben Lowry, More Catholics identify with Northern Ireland, The Newsletter, 6 July 2010
(110) Stephen Dempster, United Ireland is off the table for 25 years, The Newsletter, 29 June 2007
(111) Laurence White, 51% majority not enough for Irish unity: Ahern, The Belfast Telegraph, 20 November 2008
(112) Martin McGuinness, Time to debate a united Ireland, The Guardian, 19 February 2010
(113) Liam Clarke meets Peter Hain -Man with a north-south plan, The Sunday Times, 15 January 2006
(114) Ray O Hanlon, An all-island economy: It's Hain's way or the highway for North polls, The Irish Echo, 2-8 August 2006
(115) Liam Clarke, The border –economic asset for North and South, The Newsletter, 17 April 2008
(116) John Murray Brown, Irish boder united bargain hunters, The Financial Times, 18 November 2008
(117) Ed Moloney, Mansergh doubts the GFA will lead to unity, The Sunday Tribune, 1 October 2000. Nationalist commentator Brian Feeney noted that not only is there reluctance on the part of the Irish civil service to beef up all-Ireland structures, but the difference this time as compared to 1974 or 1986 is that Irish politicians are lukewarm too. (Brian Feeney, Ministers have lost interest in north-south links, The Irish News, 13 September 2006)
(118) Noel McAdam, North-south bodies face prospect of cash cuts, The Belfast Telegraph, 18 November 2009
(119) Fiona Gartland, United Ireland less compelling now, says Mansergh, The Irish Times, 10 June 2009. See also: Paul Bew, Roadblocks to unity, The Guardian, 19 February 2010.
(120) ‘Adams has yielded on 2016 united Ireland goal’, The Newsletter, 2 January 2009
(121) Editorial, Who are you kidding, Mr Adams? The Belfast Telegraph, 4 March 2008
(122) Frank Millar, Northern Ireland: A Triumph of Politics, Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2009, 123
(123) Dan Keenan and Tia Clarke, Deal a staging post on path to greater equality -Adams, The Irish Times, 6 February 2010
(124) Gerry Moriarty, Peace process comes of age after awkward adolescence, The Irish Times, 6 February 2010
(125) Alex Kane, Let us go out and market the benefits of the Union, The Newsletter, 5 July 2010
(126) David Sharrock, Traitors, says Martin McGuinness the general, The Times, 11 March 2009 and Anthony McIntyre, Who is McGuinness to talk of treachery? The Independent On Sunday, 15 March 2009
(127) John Hume, Grasping chance for better future, The Irish Times, 8 May 2007
(128) Seamus McKinney, Hume regrets talks didn’t happen at Sunningdale, The Irish News, 27 March 2007
(129) Editorial, Sunningdale for Slow Learners, The Sunday Independent, 1 April 2007
(130) Ruairi O Bradaigh, Our People Our Future, Dublin: Sinn Fein, 1973, pp.31-32, 43, 50-52, 59-60
(131) Cfr: Tone-the navigator, An Phoblacht, 14 June 1974, p.6 where one of the UWC’s leaders, Jim Smyth, is described as being is ‘in the Wolfe Tone tradition’
(132) Richard English, Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA, London: Macmillan, 2003, 165-166
(133) Gerry Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, Dingle: Brandon, 1986, 110
(134) The Nick Stadlen Interview with Gerry Adams, 12 September 2007
(135) Austin Currie, All Hell Will Break Loose, Dublin: O Brien Press, 2004, pp.431-435
(136) William Graham, Why did it take 3500 killings? asks Ahern, The Irish News, 8 May 2007
(137) Gerry Moriarty, Day of ‘history without drama’ goes as planned, The Irish Times, 9 May 2007
(138) Suzanne Breen, Sister of hunger-striker denounces peace process as deception, The Irish Times, 8 January 1998
(139) Roy Foster, Luck & The Irish: A Brief History of Change 1970 – 2000, London : Allen Lane, 2007, 99
(140) British and Irish Governments, Agreement at St Andrews, Belfast : Northern Ireland Office, 2006
(141) Suzanne Breen, Will the St Andrew's Agreement bring lasting peace to the North?, The Sunday Tribune, 15 October 2006
(142) DUP flyer, St Andrews Agreement/Devolution Consultation: Your Verdict -What is it to be?
(143) Paul Bew, The Making and Remaking of the Good Friday Agreement, Dublin: The Liffey Press, 2007, pp.140-143
(144) Danny Morrison, Paisley just a blip in the ongoing peace process, Daily Ireland, 9 February 2006. By 2008, Martin McGuinness said he believed Ian Paisley was doing more for Irish unity than republicans opposed to the process: "I say give me Ian Paisley any day". Cfr. William Graham, McGuinness basks at Stormont, The Irish News, 6 May 2009.
(145) Stephen Dempster, Ian Paisley Exclusive Interview, The Newsletter, 10 December 2007
(146) Ian Paisley, We can lay the foundations for a better future, The Newsletter, 31 March 2007
(147) I did ‘smash’ Sinn Fein – Paisley, BBC website, 9 March 2008
(148) Ian Paisley, ‘Today we have begun to plant and we await the harvest’, The Newsletter, 9 May 2007
(149) UVF Stands Down: the statement in full, The Irish News, 4 May 2007
(150) Peter Robinson, The Big Man was right, The Belfast Telegraph, 20 April 2007
(151) Henry McDonald, Unionists will hold vote veto, The Observer, 6 May 2007
(152) William Graham, Political institutions are working…up to a point, The Irish News, 6 May 2009
(153) Maeve Connolly, ‘Unionism winning’ claims DUP document, The Irish News, 20 November 2009

Belfast Agreement

Today The Pensive Quill carries part three of an article by guest writer Liam O Ruairc on Irish Republicanism and the Peace Process

BELFAST AGREEMENT
Liam O Ruairc

The culmination of the peace process was the signing of the Belfast Agreement on April 10th 1998 and its subsequent endorsement in two referendums on 22 May 1998. Prime Minister Blair spoke of feeling "the hand of history" during this period. (51) Not only had the Provisional movement accepted that the talks would not create a united Ireland, but they contributed little to the actual negotiations leading to the 1998 Belfast Agreement, which were essentially driven by the SDLP and the Ulster Unionists. (52) 'Sinn Fein contributed but little to the political details - 'in the dunces corner' as one Irish official put it. But with great tactical brilliance, Adams moved rapidly to embrace the Agreement and claim ownership of it against those who had actually made it.' (53) It was at the margins rather than at the centre that the Provisional movement contributed to the negotiations, mainly on the issue of prisoners release, the Irish language and policing. The Belfast Agreement fell well short of the minimum demands that would have to be met before Sinn Fein would sign any agreement. (54)

The core of the Belfast Agreement is that in exchange for republican and nationalist de facto acceptance of the legitimacy of Northern Ireland’s position within the UK and of the principle that the Union will continue as long as a majority of the people in the North support it, and also of the Dublin government’s amending of articles 2 and 3 of its constitution, the British government would replace the Government of Ireland Act and unionists would be required to accept power sharing with nationalists in the North as well as cross-border cooperation. Other elements include human rights and equality legislation; prisoner release, policing reform and the decommissioning of weapons. (55)

In terms of the central issue of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland and the circumstances in which a united Ireland could be brought about, the Belfast Agreement ensures the Union is "copper-fastened and protected". (56) The Belfast Agreement (Strand I, paragraph 33) contains a formal and explicit reiteration of British sovereignty.

It states that

"It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland". (Constititional Issues, Annex A, Section I, paragraph 1)

The British state thus made it clear that the unionist veto shall remain in place and has strengthened the partitionist ethos underlying that veto by having it enshrined it in the revised constitution of the 26 counties. (Constitutional Issues, Annex B)

The people of Ireland can exercise their right to self-determination but "this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland ". (Constitutional Issues, 1.ii.) This does not incorporate or concede the classic right of self-determination.

As legal scholar Austen Morgan notes:

"It is clear that the United Kingdom did not concede that the Irish people (in two states) had a classical right of self-determination. This is evident in the idea of separate referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, of two conditions precedent to a united Ireland and not simply a numerical majority in an all-Ireland vote." (57)

This represents the best deal unionists could possibly have won and hardly represents an advance for republicanism. In the words of Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister:

"This offers unionists every key demand they have made since partition eighty years ago...The principle of consent, no change to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority of the people, is enshrined. The Irish constitution has been changed...A devolved assembly and government for Northern Ireland is now there for the taking. When I first came to Northern Ireland as a Prime Minister, these demands were pressed in me as what unionists really needed. I have delivered them all." (58)

The Sunday Business Post in an editorial argued:

"This is no deal for nationalist Ireland. It is likely to copperfasten partition on this island for many years to come, perhaps for decades. This year, 1998, is the 200th anniversary of the 1798 rebellion. Ironically, it is also the year which will witness the greatest erosion of Irish sovereignty since the Act of Union was passed." (59)

For constitutional nationalists, such as former SDLP leader Mark Durkan, the Belfast Agreement marked "the high-water mark of Irish national democratic expression." (60) However, from a traditional republican point of view, there was a fundamental democratic deficit at the heart of the whole process which led to the 1998 Belfast Agreement.

First, it was the British state -democratically unaccountable to any Irish constituency- which determined the parameters of the negotiations, restricting them to those of the Downing Street Declaration, the Framework Document and the Mitchell Principles. The paramount principle espoused in those documents, to which all participants in future talks had to pledge their adherence and commitment, is the principle of consent. Therefore, all participants to the process were committed to partition before the talks commenced. It is thus questionable whether the Belfast Agreement could be said to have been ‘freely negotiated’.

Second, the political package on offer was subordinate to the British state’s approval. The Belfast Agreement had to be accepted and ratified by Westminster before it was presented to the people of Ireland for acceptance or rejection. An external power had the power of veto over the sovereignty of the people of Ireland, leaving aside any objections they may have. The commitment to the ‘people on the island of Ireland alone’ is therefore completely meaningless given that there is no self-determination without ‘external impediment’.

Thirdly, there were two referendums held on 22 May 1998 in two different states for different purposes and different sets of questions. (On polling day 22 May, the question on the ballot paper in the North was ‘Do you support the Agreement reached at the multi-party talks on Northern Ireland and set out in Command Paper 3883?' ’The turnout of 81.1 percent was the highest of any poll in the North since 1921. ‘Yes’ vote secured 71.1 percent and ‘No’ 28.9 percent. 96 percent of Catholics voted ‘yes’ but only 55 percent of protestants. In the south, turnout was 55.6 percent, ‘yes’ 94.4 percent and no 5.6 percent) The fact that they were held concurrently did not make them a single event and even less an act of self-determination, with the Six County referendum having the power of veto over that to be held in the Twenty Six Counties.

As legal scholar Austen Morgan points out:

"It is a travesty to claim that the people of –geographical- Ireland voted for the Agreement in an all-Ireland plebiscite. " (61)

For those three reasons, the "triple lock", the Agreement was not an exercise in self-determination, but instead was a copper-fastening of partition. For those three reasons also, the fact that the referendums were carried by a big majority of those who voted in the six counties (71%) and an even larger one in the twenty six counties (94.5%) does not refute that there was a democratic deficit in the whole process.

On 10 May 1998 the Belfast Agreement was approved 331 for and only 19 against at a special Sinn Fein conference. How can one explain that the bulk of 'relatives of dead IRA volunteers, former hunger strikers, ex-escapees, former prisoners, as well as thousands of supporters' (62) remained supporters of the Provisional movement and its leadership despite it turning republicanism on its head?

It is "thanks to the loyalty factor " as Brendan Hughes pointed out. (63) Loyalty to the movement is a decisive factor.

'The response to democratic republicanism has always been a plea to stay within the army line…The republican leadership has always exploited our loyalty' noted Brendan Hughes in a famous interview. (64)

With such mindset, that the movement must remain united becomes an imperative. (65) This is evidence of the primacy of organisational unity over unity around political principles. It is the Irish version of the social democratic maxim "the movement is everything and the principles nothing". (66) Once the movement is more important than principles, Republicanism becomes whatever the leadership of the movement said it is. "Thus Republicanism that declared ‘No Return to Stormont’ in 1997 was still Republicanism when it meant Executive ministries at Stormont in 1999." (67)

The intervention of prisoners in support of the leadership was also important. (68) Had the Provisionals not backed the Belfast Agreement, the prisoners aligned to the movement would have had to spend long years in jail, but thanks to the 1998 Agreement, 242 of their prisoners in the six counties and 57 others in the 26 counties would be eligible for release within two years. For Gerry Adams, "released prisoners are the best ambassadors for the peace process". (69)

This is to be contrasted with what an IRA spokesperson stated in 1975: ""Suppose we get the release of all detainees, an amnesty and withdrawal of troops to barracks, we are still where we started in 1969." (70)

Finally, as Henry Patterson writes, " ‘war-weariness’ helped create a basis for republicans settling for a partitionist fudge in 1998 ". (71)

Local and international media hailed the Agreement as a ‘new dawn’. One of the key reasons for referedum’s results is that the 1998 Belfast Agreement was promoted by ‘manufacturing consent’ -- as Chomsky would have put it -- that a "No" vote meant a vote for violence and a "Yes" vote as a vote for peace, manipulating opinion polls and relegating dissenting voices to the margins. (72)

"Information Strategy", a British government document written by Tom Kelly, formerly of the BBC and Director of Communications at the Northern Ireland Office at the time of the Agreement outlines the government's strategy for getting the right result through campaign of blatant media manipulation designed to flood Northern Ireland with positive stories about the peace deal. (73)

The "Yes" Campaign also called in the assistance of top advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi, who designed their billboard campaign free of charge. Saatchi & Saatchi was credited with winning the 1979 election for the UK Tory Party, and branding the Thatcherite project in the 1980s. Many people voted ‘yes’ because they were war-weary and thought they were voting for peace. (74)

However, to think that republicans who were calling for a ‘no’ vote were against peace and for violence is wrong. The problem as Bernadette McAliskey notes is that the aim of the process " is to eradicate republicanism, not violence ". (75) The irony of it all is that some republicans who seriously questioned the politics of the ‘process’ seemed to be among the few who genuinely supported the ‘peace’ – it was the ‘process’ that they opposed, not the ‘peace’. (76) Anti-Agreement republicans would also emphasize that while they are for peace, they are not for ‘peace at any price’ ; and in the view of Republicans opposed to the Belfast Agreement the 1998 treaty is precisely peace at the wrong price.

The real question is not ‘peace’ but ‘peace on whose terms ?’ In this case it is peace on British terms. By copperfastening and protecting the Union, the Belfast Agreement reinforces rather than removes the cause of conflict and therefore will not bring lasting peace. It is not peace with justice but an unjust settlement as the right of self-determination of the people of Ireland as a whole is "subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland ". As David McKittrick writes, they " disapprove of the peace because it is bringing the wrong sort of peace. " (77) The term for a peace in which justice is subordinated is ‘pacification’. This is why it is more accurate to speak of a " pacification process " rather than a ‘peace process’. (78)



NOTES

(51) Tony Blair, Hard work came after the handshake – building trust, The Irish Times, 4 April 2008
(52) Cfr. Thomas Hennessey, Negotiating the Belfast Agreement, in Brian Barton and Patrick J Roche (eds), The Northern Ireland Question: The Peace Process and the Belfast Agreement, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp.38-56
(53) Paul Bew, Ireland: The Politics of Enmity 1789-2006, Oxford University Press, 2007, 549. See also Paul Bew, The Triumph of the Belfast Agreement, in Brian Barton and Patrick J Roche (eds), The Northern Ireland Question: The Peace Process and the Belfast Agreement, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 240-241.
(54) As set out by Gerry Adams in an Ireland on Sunday article on 8 March 1998. Amongst the ‘minimum’ criteria were powerful cross-border bodies immune from the northern assembly, the disbandment of the RUC and no weakening of Dublin’s constitutional claim to the North. See also Gerry Adams, Change needed for North’s transition, The Irish Times, 13 March 1998
(55) The Agreement: Text of the Agreement reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations on Northern Ireland (Cmnd.3883), Befast : HMSO, 1998. (Available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm) See also Austen Morgan, The Belfast Agreement: A Practical Legal Analysis, London: The Belfast Press, 2000
(56) Austin Currie, All Hell Will Break Loose, Dublin: O Brien Press, 2004, 434
(57) Austen Morgan, The Belfast Agreement and the Constitutional Status of Northern Ireland, in Brian Barton and Patrick J Roche (eds), The Northern Ireland Question: The Peace Process and the Belfast Agreement, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 86
(58) Blair’s Dawn Call kept the heat on Trimble, The Sunday Times, 4 July 1999
(59) Editorial, This is no ‘deal’ for Nationalist Ireland, The Sunday Business Post, 12 April 1998
(60) Dan Keenan, ‘Criticism I can take. Things that are dishonest I find a lot harder’, The Irish Times, 6 February 2010
(61) Austen Morgan, The Belfast Agreement and the Constitutional Status of Northern Ireland, in Brian Barton and Patrick J Roche, The Northern Ireland Question: The Peace Process and the Belfast Agreement, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 90
(62) Danny Morrison, A time to build trust, The Observer, 22 April 2001
(63) Ed Moloney, Voices From the Grave: Two Men’s War in Ireland, London: Faber and Faber, 2010, 291
(64) Interview with Brendan Hughes, Fourthwrite, Issue 1, Spring 2000
(65) See for example the articles ‘United We Stand’ as well as ‘Forward in Unity’ in An Phoblacht Republican News, 7 May 1998
(66) Etienne Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, London: Verso, 1998, 89
(67) Gerard Murray and Jonathan Tonge, Sinn Fein and the SDLP From Alienation to Participation, London: Hurst & Company, 2005, 261. Gerry Adams made this remarkable admission in 2000: "So coming into the current situation, all of you have read Lewis Carroll and may see the making of a Lewis Carroll novel at what is happening at the moment...We are now faced with the prospect that a British Government is going to bring down Stormont on the back of a Unionist demand, and Irish Republicans are running themselves ragged, trying to stop them from doing it. I saw a Sinn Fein picket at Glengall Street (Unionist headquarters - LOR) saying 'Don't Collapse The Institutions of Stormont!' How did we get into that position?...We went to a special Ard Fheis of our party, and then we went to another special Ard Fheis of our party, and we turned policy on its head. We did it because we listened to what the Unionists were saying, we did it because we wanted to make a real practical symbolic concession to Unionism, and we did it because we wanted to continue with dialogue in a space that they were comfortable in." (John Brewer (ed), Talking To One's Opponents, Armagh: Centre for the Social Study of Religion, 2000, 22)
(68) Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, second revised and updated edition, 2007 pp.480-483
(69) Jonathan Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland, London: The Bodley Head, 2008, 100-101
(70) Paul Bew and Henry Patterson, The British State and the Ulster Crisis, London: Verso, 1985, 84
(71) Henry Patterson, Inevitable deal would be mix of clarity and vagueness, The Newsletter, 6 February 2010
(72) Cfr : Thomas Taafe, Images of Peace: The Newsmedia, Politics and the Good Friday Agreement, in Jorg Neudeiser and Stefan Wolff (eds) Peace at Last? The Impact of the Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland, New York: Berghahn Books, 2003, pp.111-132. See also Ed Moloney, The Peace Process and Journalism, in Britain & Ireland: Lives Entwined II, London : The British Council, 2006, pp.64-84 for a sharp and critical analysis of the media during the peace process.
(73) Full text of the document: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/nio26398.htm
(74) Bernadette Hayes and Ian McAllister, Who voted for peace ? Public support for the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, Irish Political Studies, 16 (2001), pp. 61-82
(75) Bernadette McAliskey, Where Are We Now In The Peace Process? The Irish Reporter, February 1996, 28
(76) Anthony McIntyre, The war may be over, but the violence still lingers on, The Scotsman, 3 November 2000
(77) David McKittrick, The afterlife of the IRA : The dissident groups bent on shattering the peace in Northern Ireland, The Independent, 8 November 2008
(78) Chris Gilligan, Peace or Pacification Process? A brief critique of the peace process, in Chris Gilligan and Jonathan Tonge (eds), Peace or War? Understanding the Peace Process in Northern Ireland, Aldershot : Ashgate, 1997

Into the Peace Process

Today The Pensive Quill carries part two of an article by guest writer Liam O Ruairc on Irish Republicanism and the Peace Process

INTO THE PEACE PROCESS
Liam O Ruairc

In the early 1990s, the Provisional leadership engaged in secret talks with the British government which would culminate with the IRA declaring a ceasefire on 31 August 1994 in order to allow Sinn Fein participate in the peace negotiations. This, as well as other positive signals from the British and Irish governments, led the Provisional to believe that at some point in the 1990s London and Dublin agreed that the old policy of excluding republicans was futile and that the only strategic alternative was one of inclusion in dialogue and negotiations. According to Gerry Adams: "The British policy in Ireland has changed dramatically… British policy was about repressing republicanism; British policy in the last decade, or so, has been about trying to find some accommodation with republicanism." (31)

However, what goes unmentioned here is that 'the strategic objective was to include republicans while excluding republicanism'. (32) The price to be paid for the inclusion of republicans in the talks was the exclusion of republicanism.

This means dialogue with Republican leaders and organisations but on the basis of an agenda that excludes the political objectives of Republicanism. The whole peace process may have included Republicans, but from the 1993 Downing Street Declaration to the final 1998 Belfast Agreement, was always based on the British state’s political alternative to Republicanism since 1972: an internal solution (a power sharing assembly in the North which includes Nationalists) with the externality of an Irish dimension (cross border bodies) grafted on it. The longstanding Republican demands were never serious runners for all party talks, and none of them appeared in the final Belfast Agreement.

'What the British were allowing republicans - by permitting them into all-party talks where they can argue for a united Ireland without the remotest possibility of securing it - is an opportunity to dig a tunnel to the moon.' (33)

From a British state perspective ‘talking to terrorists’ only made sense in the context were the Provisional movement was sufficiently weakened to consider a way out of its campaign as opposed to a general attempt to bring ‘extremists’ into the ‘democratic’ process without rigid preconditions. (34) By negotiating with the Provisional movement, the British state was signalling to the IRA a way out of its armed campaign rather than a way out of Ireland for itself. This is evident from the political parameters of the peace process.

As Lord David Trimble later wrote:

"Crucially it was soon made clear (to Republicans) that there were conditions before there could be an official engagement. The key conditions were later formalised in the Downing Street declaration of 1993 as an end to violence and a commitment to exclusively peaceful and democratic means. Equally important was the government's commitment to the consent principle and its refusal to act as a persuader for a united Ireland, which prefigured the outcome of the formal interparty talks, the three-stranded structure of which were defined in March 1991, and the key procedural decisions taken by the parties in 1992 in the absence of Sinn Féin. When it called the cessation of its campaign in 1994, republicans were, in effect, accepting these parameters for talks." (35)

All this was evident early on, in the 15 December 1993 Downing Street Declaration, which laid the parameters for future negotiations. (36) In it, the London and Dublin governments recognised that a political settlement "may as of right, take the form of agreed structures for the island as a whole, including a united Ireland achieved by peaceful means".

Article 4 of the Declaration stated: "The British government agree that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish." But the ‘right’ of self-determination was heavily qualified by the fact that constitutional change would be dependent upon the consent of a majority in the North.

In article 2 of the Declaration, the London and Dublin governments committed themselves to Northern Ireland’s consitutional guarantee. This implied continued British jurisdiction over Northern Ireland and full recognition of that jurisdiction by the Dublin goverment.

Article 5 had the Taoiseach on behalf of the Dublin government accepting that "the democratic right of self-determination by the people of Ireland as a whole must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of the people of Northern Ireland". The formula of the Downing Street Declaration ensured that any agreed settlement would be partitionist and copper-fasten the Unionist veto. The Downing Street Declaration was bereft of the idea that the British government should ‘persuade’ the Unionists of a united Ireland.

In the House of Commons, British Prime Minister John Major stated that the Declaration "reaffirms the constitutional guarantee in the clearest possible terms":

"What is not in the Declaration is any suggestion that the British Government should join the ranks of the persuaders of the ‘value’ and ‘legitimacy’ of a united Ireland; that is not there. Nor is there any suggestion that the future status of Northern Ireland should be decided by a single act of self-determination by the people of Ireland as a whole; that is not there either. Nor is there any timetable for constitutional change, or any arrangement for joint authority over Northern Ireland. In sum, the Declaration provides that it is, as it must be, for the people of Northern Ireland to determine their own future." (37)

There was a clear political tension between republicanism and the Declaration. As BBC journalist Peter Taylor reminds us, "Although on the face of it the Joint Declaration was a nationalist green in colour, it was essentially a unionist document effectively enshrining the unionist veto that the Provisionals had spent years fighting to destroy." (38)

In the course of its twelve points, the principle of consent was mentioned eight times. However, the reaction of the Provisional Republican movement was interesting: "The Provisionals had rejected the Sunningdale Agreement outright in 1973. They had condemned -sometimes stridently- the Ango-Irish Agreement twelve years later, but with some qualifications that left room for recognition that indeed it contained progressive elements. When confronted with the Downing Street Declaration, the Provisionals hesitated." (39)

Sinn Fein sought 'clarification' of the Declaration, yet neither accepted nor rejected its contents, although the IRA ceasefire statement pointed that it was not a solution. But this clearly indicated a shift away from the traditional republican position. 'Ultimately, whatever the language of the declaration, the people of the island were not afforded the opportunity to exercise the right of self determination to bring about a united Ireland. Such an option was never laid before the electorate and even if it had been the exercise would have been futile given the continuing Northern veto.' (40)

On 22 February 1995 the London and Dublin governments published the Framework For The Future documents which provided a possible outline for a political deal. (41) The Framework For Accountable Government In Northern Ireland proposed that Northern Ireland should have its own elected assembly with devolved powers. A New Framework For Agreement dealt with North-South relations. It envisaged the establishment of cross border bodies which would seek to harmonise tourism, education, and economic development all accountable to the devolved Assembly.

As paragraph 10 made clear, the Framework documents were predicated on the continuation of the union and that any movement away from that could only be achieved with the agreement of a Northern Ireland assemby.

Paragraph 35 emphasized that North-South bodies would have a role subordinate to the Northeren assembly. Paragraph 21 also stated that the Dublin government would change its constitution to "reflect the principle of consent".

British Prime Minister John Major reassured unionists that there was a ‘triple lock’ against constitutional change:

"There is a triple safeguard against any proposals being imposed on Northern Ireland; first, any proposals must command the support of the political parties in Northern Ireland; secondly, any proposals must then be approved by the people of Northern Ireland in a referendum; and thirdly, any necessary legislation must be passed by this parliament. That provides a triple lock designed to ensure that nothing is implemented without consent." (42)

Despite this the response of the provisional republican leadership to the Framework Documents was enthusiastic. (43)

However, by early 1998, the Unionists succeeded to severely dilute in the final Heads of Agreement documents that had been published by the London and Dublin government to outline the basis of a settlement on 12 January 1998 most of the cross-border elements that had originally figured in the 1995 Framework Documents, making the Heads of Agreement far less of a threat to Unionism than the 1995 Documents. (44)

Finally, on 24 January 1996, the report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning (also known as the Mitchell report) published its six principles which sought to establish the entry requirements to political negotiations and define the nature of all future political activity. (45)

The principles included renouncing the use of force and a committment to exclusively peaceful means to resolve political issues, as well as the total disarmament of so-called paramilitary organisations verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission.

On 09 September 1997, the Sinn Fein leadership signed up to the Mitchell principles. This was in contradiction with the IRA’s constitution as it challenged the IRA’s right to bear arms. In accepting the principles, they accepted the British state’s definition of what constituted democracy and what it regarded as legitimate opposition. Decommissioning only targeted organisations regarded by the state as illegitimate, while these had to renounce ‘violence’ the report did not question the state’s right to use force. Decommissioning was not synonymous with multilateral demilitarisation.

By the time Sinn Fein entered political negotiations in September 1997 after the Provisional IRA reinstated its ceasefire on 19 July 1997, the political parameters had been set and any future political arrangement would be a predominantly internal one. The republican political agenda was degraded to the point where Gerry Adams now wrote about 'renegotiating the Union' rather than ending it. (46)

The process that the Provisional Republican movement joined was pre-programmed to deliver a partitionist settlement. At their first ever Downing Street meeting in 1997 British Prime Minister Tony Blair asked Gerry Adams if he could go back and tell his people 'there was no possibility of a united Ireland.' And at its conclusion Blair told key aides 'he was pleased that Adams seemed to accept he would have to live with something less than a united Ireland' as the outcome of the peace process. (47)

Alasdair Campbell’s diaries show that Blair made it clear to the Provisional leadership that the settlement would not "explicitly commit to a united Ireland" and that "Adams was ok" with such parameters, although McGuiness appears to have been more relunctant. (48)

In his 2008 book on the process, Great Hatred Little Room, former Downing Street chief of staff Jonathan Powell confirms Blair's essentially pro-Union position from the outset of the negotiations leading to the Belfast Agreement.

While still leader of the opposition at Westminster Blair had abandoned Labour's traditional policy of Irish unity by consent. Over time he then moved from a position of ostensible neutrality on the constitutional issue to one of effective support for maintaining the union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland based on the 'consent' principle subsequently enshrined in the 1998 Belfast Agreement. (49)

In a speech given in Belfast in 1997, Prime Minister Blair articulated his position on Northern Ireland in forthright terms:

"My message is simple. I am committed to Northern Ireland. I am committed to the principle of consent. … My agenda is not a united Ireland… I believe in the United Kingdom. I value the Union…Northern Ireland will remain part of the United Kingdom as long as a majority here wish…This principle of consent is and will be at the heart of my government’s policies on Northern Ireland. It is the key principle… A political settlement is not a slippery slope to a united Ireland. The government will not be persuaders for unity." (50)

NOTES

(31) The Nick Stadlen Interview with Gerry Adams, 12 September 2007. Audio version and full transcript in two parts: http://politics.guardian.co.uk/podcasts/story/0,,2166144,00.html
(32) Anthony McIntyre, Good Friday : The Death of Irish Republicanism, New York : Ausubo Press, 2008, 3
(33) Anthony McIntyre, Sinn Fein stance hinders Republican cause, The Sunday Tribune, 20 July 1997
(34) For an interesting discussion of the Irish model and its misunderstanding see: John Bew, Martyn Frampton, Inigo Gurruchaga, Talking To Terrorists: Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, London: Hurst & Company, 2009
(35) David Trimble, "Ulster’s Lesson for the Middle East: Don’t Indulge Extremists", The Guardian, 25 October 2007
(36) British and Irish Governments, Joint Declaration on Peace: The Downing Street Declaration (15 December 1993) London: Prime Minister’s Office, 1993. (available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/dsd151293.htm)
(37) Hansard, sixth series, vol. 234 col. 1072-3, quoted in Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, Northern Ireland: A chronology of the Troubles 1968-1999, Dublin: Gill&MacMillan, 1999, 283-284
(38) Peter Taylor, The Provos: the IRA and Sinn Fein, London: Bloomsbury, 1998, 343
(39) Jack Holland, Hope Against History: The course of conflict in Northern Ireland, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999, 251
(40) Jonathan Tonge, Northern Ireland, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006,124
(41) British and Irish Governments, The Framework Documents – A New Framework For Agreement (22 February 1995), London: Prime Minister’s Office, 1995. (available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/fd22295.htm)
(42) Hansard, sixth series, vol. 255 col. 358, quoted in Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, Northern Ireland: A chronology of the Troubles 1968-1999, Dublin: Gill&MacMillan, 1999, 304
(43) Facing The Challenge, An Phoblacht Republican News, 23 February 1995
(44) Henry McDonald, Gunsmoke and Mirrors: How Sinn Fein dressed up defeat as victory, Dublin: Gill&Macmillan, 2008, 154-155
(45) Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning (24 January 1996), Belfast: Northern Ireland Office, 1996. (available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/gm24196.htm)
(46) Another chance for progress, An Phoblacht-Republican News ,24 July 1997
(47) Jonathan Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland, London: The Bodley Head, 2008, 23
(48) Alastair Campbell, The Blair Years, (London: Hutchinson, 2007) pp.252, 265
(49) Jonathan Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland, London: The Bodley Head, 2008, 11-12 and 79-80
(50) Address delivered by British Prime Minister Tony Blair at the Royal Agricultural Society, Belfast, 16 May 1997. (available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/tb16597.htm)

Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block?

Today The Pensive Quill carries the first in a five part series of an article by guest writer Liam O Ruairc on Irish Republicanism and the Peace Process

STEPPING STONE OR STUMBLING BLOCK? IRISH REPUBLICANISM AND THE PEACE PROCESS
by Liam O Ruairc

The peace process has been the major political development in Ireland in recent years. What is the ‘peace process’? According to the University of Ulster’s Conflict Archive On the Internet: "The Irish peace process, or peace process, is the term used to describe the series of attempts to achieve an end to the civil conflict and a political settlement for the differences that divide the community in Northern Ireland." (1)

A more accurate definition can be found in wikipedia: "The peace process, when discussing the history of Northern Ireland, is often considered to cover the events leading up to the 1994 Provisional Irish Republican Army ceasefire, the end of most of the violence of the Troubles, the Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreement, and subsequent political developments." (2)

According to Richard English, "the great change which made possible the Northern Ireland peace process was the new direction in which Provisional republican nationalism (sic) turned in the 1990s, easily the most significant change in Irish politics in the last decades of the twentieth century." (3)

What is the nature of this change and what have been the implications of the peace process for republicanism? Is it a new phase of the struggle, a progressive development which provides the transitional mechanisms for a united Ireland as Provisional Sinn Fein claims or does it represent a defeat for republicanism, the copper fastening of partition and the transformation of republicanism into constitutional nationalism?

REPUBLICANISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISM

The peace process involved a dramatic change in the relation of republicanism to constitutional nationalism. Constitutional nationalism is represented mainly by Fianna Fail, the largest political party in the 26 counties south of Ireland; and by the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in the 6 counties of the North. Republicanism is usually associated with Sinn Fein and the Provisional republican movement.

Democracy is the central concept of republicanism. It holds that the people of Ireland have a right to self-determination as a unit without external impediment –all Ireland democracy. It rejects the British state’s interferrence in Irish affairs as a barrier to democracy and views this as the root cause of the conflict in Ireland. It argues that the state institutions of the 26 counties as much as the 6 counties retain their legitimacy by a denial and circumscription of political democracy. All-Ireland democracy is denied by those institutions.

Democracy is also central to constitutional nationalism, but it has a very different understanding of the concept. While it talks about the validity of self-determination as an aspiration it accepts existing constitutional parameters and recognises the legitimacy of state institutions north and south and will participate and work through them. It identifies democracy with constitutionalism whereas for republicanism there is a tension between the two.

One of the core differences between constitutional nationalism and republicanism’s understanding of democracy is that for constitutional nationalism there can be no changes in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority there. Unionists must be conciliated not coerced.

Republicanism does not disregard the issue of Unionist consent to political arrangements, where it differs from constitutional nationalism is that it refuses Unionist consent to be a prerequisite for constitutional change. While arguing that it is undesirable to coerce a ‘minority,’ republicanism contends that to give a guarantee to a ‘minority’ in advance against all coercion is to put a premium on unreasonableness and to make a settlement impossible. It will have no incentives to consider other political options so long as the British government gives it unconditional guarantees. The consent of a minority becomes transformed into a veto over the majority - unity by consent of a minority, partition by coercion of the majority. For republicanism to argue that partition is democratic because a majority in the 6 counties favours it ignores the fact that it is an artificial majority that was created by partition in the first place.

Given its acceptance of existing institutional and constitutional parameters, for constitutional nationalism political change can come only from within those and through constitutional means only. The only legitimate means to effect political change are the legal ones, "ballot box and ballot box alone". For constitutional nationalism, this distinguishes the ‘democrats’ from the ‘men of violence’. It repudiates what it regards as the illegal and illegitimate ‘violence of the IRA not because it is pacificst and anti-violence, but because it holds that the only legitimate ‘force’ is that of the state.

Given that republicanism questions the democratic legitimacy of state institutions it is not surprising that it refuses to limit its options to what the state regards as legitimate political activity, including challenging the state’s monopoly of force. It is not that republicanism disregards peaceful and constitutional methods, but it argues that history and experience show that physical force has evoked a response from the British state, whereas peaceful methods of protest tend to be greeted with indifference. If constitutional methods fail, it is prepared to envisage extra-constitutional means as a last resort to effect political change if there is no alternative. Republicanism and constitutional nationalism’s respective understanding of democracy shape their attitude to the use of force. For example, Gerry Adams described the Brighton bomb as "a blow for democracy" whereas constitutional nationalism saw it as an attack on democracy.

In terms of their understanding of democracy and and legitimacy and their relation to the state the opposition between republicanism and constitutional nationalism is sharp. However from the second half of the 1980s, the Provisionals proactively sought to bridge the incommensurable gap between republicanism and constitutional nationalism. According to Gerry Adams: "What is needed is a strategy to bring the greatest possible number of people into the process of struggle. Since at this stage the majority of nationalists look to constitutional nationalism for their political leadership, this requires placing pressure on constitutional politicians to take up and defend the interests of the people they claim to represent." (4)

This meant not just Fianna Fail, the Provisionals political "second cousins" (5) "even Fine Gael retains its Michael Collins tendency and sections of the Labour Party have an anti-imperialist instinct." (6) Shortly before, the Republican leadership had denounced this move as "disastrous, because from Fianna Fail and Fine Gael can only come a dilution of the nationalist aspiration, which could be further diluted under the pressure of Loyalist and British demands." (7)

The Republican view was "that the two parties merely constitute two different brands of Free Statism, both with the same pro-British and partitionist message." (8) Adams argued that the demand for self determination was "vigorously diluted and undermined by 'constitutional' nationalists." (9)

'There can be no such thing as an Irish nationalist accepting the loyalist veto and partition. You cannot claim to be an Irish nationalist if you consent to an internal six-county settlement and if you are willing to negotiate the state of Irish society with a foreign government.' (10)

This is why for republicanism the concept of constitutional nationalism "is a contradiction in terms" as it puts nationalism "within the framework of British constitutionality. Irish nationalism within British constitutionality is a contradiction in terms." (11)

In the North, the movement was also seeking to have a common approach with its main election and political rival, the SDLP. (12) Already during the electoral campaigns for the Assembly in 1982 and the General Election in 1983, the Provisionals while stressing the clearly defined hostility between Sinn Féin and the SDLP, were also making appeals for nationalist unity against the British government.

In 1983, Danny Morrison had urged discussions on how to "secure maximum nationalist successes" (13) and Sinn Fein called for an electoral pact with the SDLP during the 1983 Westminster elections. (14) In a BBC Radio interview with John Hume and Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein President called for discussions on 'pan nationalist interests' between the two parties. (15) Whatever its criticism of the SDLP role in brokering the Anglo Irish Agreement, on 18 November 1985, Morrison stated that SF was willing to enter an electoral pact with SDLP and Adams was calling for what he termed "pan-nationalist unity". (16)

By tending to blur the distinction between the terms of nationalism and republicanism, the Provisionals were eliding a previously mutually irreconcilable hostility between constitutional nationalism and republicanism. This involved a gradual shift towards a shared ‘nationalist agenda’. If in 1981 the SDLP were castigated as ‘an amalgamation of middle class Redmondites devoid of principle, direction and courage’ (17) by 1988 Sinn Fein was stating that 'rather than denouncing the party, republicans should take a constructive approach with the SDLP'’ (18).

For that reason, between January and September 1988, representatives of Sinn Fein and the SDLP held a series of four meetings which at the time ended in disagreement. (19) "A simple but fundamental point that few paid attention at the time was that Sinn Fein wanted to cooperate with the SDLP and the Irish government" (20) rather than oppose them as previously. This could only but seriously weaken republicanism’s anti-partitionist thrust, as those elements have always been much more hostile to the IRA than to British involvement in Ireland.

FROM REPUBLICANISM TO SHARED NATIONALIST AGENDA

By the early 1990s the Provisional movement was explicitely envisaging a strategic alliance with constitutional nationalism as the way forward. This alliance has been a central feature of the peace process. Sinn Fein, in its own words, was searching for "an effective unarmed constitutional strategy". (21) Central to the new strategy (outlined in the 1992 Sinn Fein document Towards a Lasting Peace and the 1994 Provisional IRA TUAS document) was the idea that the pan nationalist alliance of the Irish government, Sinn Fein, and the SDLP could pressurize the British government in a diplomatic offensive to 'persuade' the Unionists that their interest was in a united Ireland.

The Provisionals spent a long time in the early 1990s building that pan nationalist coalition through secret talks with Fianna Fail and the Irish government, and through open discussions with the SDLP, in particular the Hume-Adams initiatives of 1993. When the Provisional movement finally succeeded to build an alliance with those other political forces, it was not on its own terms: for this 'national consensus' to be possible, it had to accept considerable sections of the SDLP and Fianna Fail's constitutional nationalist agenda.

The emphasis was no longer on the traditional objective of an end to British rule, but upon its recognition that 'the Irish people as a whole have a right to self-determination' . While in appearance being in continuity with traditional republican demand, the concept represented a shift in position, because the constitutional nationalist understanding of self-determination allows for a degree of ambiguity around the means of exercising that right.

For example this means that if a majority of people in Ireland as a whole decide that there will be no united Ireland until a majority of people in the North decide to, that constitutes national self-determination rather than a partitionist compromise. Consequently, the Provisional movement now stated that the exercise of self determination was a matter for agreement between the people of Ireland. This signaled a profound change.

The 23 April 1993 Hume Adams statement contained the following two crucial sentences:

'The exercise of self-determination is a matter for agreement between the people of Ireland. It is the search for that agreement and the means of achieving it on which we will be concentrating.' (22)

Never before had the republican movement stated publicly that there had to be agreement on the exercise of self-determination. That meant that any accomodation had to be based on terms acceptable to the Unionist community. It meant that the unionist community had a veto over whatever was to happen. In other words, it was the Unionist veto rewritten. The Provisional movement now recognised that the consent and allegiance of Unionists are essential if a lasting peace is to be established. While still arguing that the unionist veto must go, they were "seeking to obtain the consent of a majority of people in the North" (23).

However, the difficulty with this is that the unionist right to consent is precisely what republicans have always claimed constituted that veto: unity by consent of the majority of the North of Ireland was nothing more than a partitionist fudge.

Last but not least, the Provisional revised its analysis of the British presence. Rather than being seen as the cause of the problem it was now seen as part of the solution, the British government now given a neutral if not a positive role by "joining the ranks of the persuaders" and convincing the Unionists that their future lies in a united Ireland. The Provisional Movement’s new strategy as outlined in Towards a Lasting Peace "marked in black and white the huge sea change that had taken place in republican thinking", the document "was important not only for what it said but for what it did not say. Gone was the colonial and imperialist analysis and even more fundamental, gone was the traditional demand for British withdrawal": "In 1972, the IRA have the British three years to leave; in 1987 Sinn Fein had extended it to the lifetime of one parliament, or five years. By 1992, not only was there no deadline (…) but Sinn Fein acknowledged there was a role for Britain to play in Ireland." (24)

Thus it is not the Dublin government and the SDLP that had come to the Republican position, but rather the Provisional movement which had moved to the constitutional nationalist position that Irish self determination would have to be achieved with the consent of the people of the North. When the 1994 IRA internal document TUAS argued that "for the first time in twenty-five years all the major nationalist parties are rowing in roughly the same direction" this was true; only one of those parties, Sinn Fein, had altered course. (25)

On top of that, "Fianna Fail was rowing away from its claim to Northern Ireland, and the SDLP was formulating explicit approval of the principle of unionist consent, neither of which could be interpreted as republican advancement." (26) This "effectively marks the ideological defeat of Provisional Republicanism…and the beginning of its absorption into the wider spectrum of constitutional nationalism." (27) Republicanism had become subsumed within a partitionist nationalist project. The price of the inclusion of Republicans in the pan nationalist alliance was the exclusion of Republicanism.

Parallel to this, the objective of a 32 county socialist republic was given a very ‘ultimate’ nature. A very important departure from previous positions was that the Provisionals now stated that "the British government’s departure must be preceded by a sustained period of peace and will arise out of negotiations" (28).

In 1993, Martin McGuiness signaled this major compromise on the objective of 'Brits Out' when at Bodenstown, he spoke about 'interim arrangements', implying that armed struggle might end short of British withdrawal.(29) Those interim arrangements would provide a transition (duration unspecified) into the ultimate objective. Later, in early 1995, Gerry Adams spoke of a 'transitional phase' in which there must be 'maximum democracy', 'equality of treatment' and 'parity of esteem'.(30) Those statements signalled that the Provisional leadership would inevitably attempt to sell any future political agreement as transitional, while ignoring the absence of any concrete transitional mechanisms for democratic political change, thus representing a de facto recognition of British rule in Ireland.






NOTES

(1) CAIN, The Irish Peace Process – Summary, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/sum.htm
(2) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Ireland_peace_process
(3) Richard English, Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland, London : Macmillan, 2006, 404
(4) Gerry Adams, A Pathway To Peace, Cork and Dublin: Mercier, 1988, 62
(5) Gerry Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, Dingle: Brandon, 1986, 48
(6) Gerry Adams, A Pathway To Peace, Cork and Dublin: Mercier, 1988, 37
(7) Fighters Against the British presence, An Phoblacht-Republican News, 7 April 1983
(8) Different brands of Free Statism-Same Message, An Phoblacht-Republican News, 21 March 1981
(9) London-Dublin Accord: What Next? An Phoblacht-Republican News 12 December 1985
(10) The Summit's Depths, An Phoblacht-Republican News, 22 November 1984
(11) Gerry Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom, Dingle: Brandon, 1986, 112
(12) Gerry Adams, A Pathway To Peace, Cork and Dublin: Mercier, 1988, 73
(13) An Phoblacht-Republican News , 28 April 1983
(14) Gerard Murray and Jonathan Tonge, Sinn Fein and the SDLP From Alienation to Participation, London: Hurst & Company, 2005, 124, 164
(15) BBC, Behind The Headlines, 31 January 1985
(16) An Phoblacht-Republican News , 21 Nov 1985
(17) Why We Ended the Hunger Strikes, An Phoblacht-Republican News, 10 Oct 1981
(18) Broadening the Base, An Phoblacht-Republican News, 30 June 1988
(19) Sinn Fein-SDLP Talks, Belfast: Republican Publications, 1988
(20) Brian Feeney, Sinn Fein: A Hundred Turbulent Years, Dublin: The O Brien Press, 2002, pp.356-357
(21) Quoted in Brian Feeney, Sinn Fein: A Hundred Turbulent Years, Dublin: The O Brien Press, 2002, 380
(22) Joint Statements from Gerry Adams and John Hume, An Phoblacht-Republican News, 30 September 1993
(23) Towards A Lasting Peace, 12
(24) Brian Feeney, Sinn Fein: A Hundred Turbulent Years, Dublin: The O Brien Press, 2002, 378
(25) Gerard Murray and Jonathan Tonge, Sinn Fein and the SDLP From Alienation to Participation, London: Hurst & Company, 2005, 188. Also note that President Clinton wrote that US intelligence services informed him that Adams was willing to call the armed campaign off, and for that reason gave him a visa on order to "boost Adams’ leverage within Sinn Fein and the IRA…while increasing American influence with him." So it is clearly not the Provisionals who were influencing the White House as they claimed, but the White House using Adams to fit the Provisional movement within the framework of US strategic interests. Cfr. Bill Clinton, My Life, London : London : Random House, 2004, 580
(26) Jonathan Tonge, Nationalist Convergence? in: Aaron Edwards and Stephen Bloomer, Transforming the Peace Process in Northern Ireland: From terrorism to democratic politics, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2008, 65
(27) Jack Holland, Hope Against History: The course of conflict in Northern Ireland, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999, 247
(28) It is our job to develop the struggle for freedom-Bodenstown Address, An Phoblacht-Republican News, 5 June 1992
(29) There will be no turning back, An Phoblacht-Republican News, 24 June 1993
(30) Peace means justice – Justice demands freedom, An Phoblacht-Republican News, 2 March 1995